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iAbstract 
 
In a refreshingly clear and comprehensive decision issued towards the end of its 2004 
Term, the Supreme Court explained in Lingle v. Chevron (2005) that the Takings Clause requires 
compensation only for the effects of a regulation on an individual’s property rights.  Under the 
substantive due process doctrine, by contrast, courts engage in a deferential inquiry into both a 
regulation’s validity and the means by which the regulation attempts to meet the government’s 
objective.  Lingle’s explanation appeared to cast doubt on the doctrinal foundation and reach of 
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994), two 
regulatory takings decisions that reviewed “exactions,” regulatory conditions placed on 
proposals to develop land.  These decisions required courts to apply the heightened scrutiny of 
their “nexus” and “proportionality” tests to review not only the challenged condition’s effects but 
also its validity and means.  In a somewhat oblique final section of Lingle that could be 
dismissed as non-binding dicta, the Court characterized its exactions jurisprudence as a limited 
effort to protect owners from extortionate exactions that single out individual property owners 
and confiscate their land and right to exclude the public.  Lingle explained that the Court’s 
rigorous tests for exactions, and their focus on regulatory means, apply only when an exaction’s 
effects constitute a clear taking of property. 
 
Lingle’s description of its exactions decisions left important matters open for debate—
matters that this Article attempts to resolve.  Lingle’s narrow characterization of its exactions 
decisions is not dicta because Lingle aimed to provide a comprehensive, unifying explication of 
the entirety of the Court’s takings jurisprudence; and even if dicta, Lingle repeats similar 
statements in recent decisions about the limited nature of Nollan and Dolan and therefore makes 
plain what the Court assumes it has already settled.  Furthermore, when read as Lingle requires, 
Nollan and Dolan fit within the broader approach to the Takings Clause that the Court articulated 
in Lingle and its other Takings Clause decisions from the same term, San Remo Hotel v. City and 
County of San Francisco (2005) and Kelo v. City of New London (2005).  A narrow 
understanding of Nollan and Dolan is thoroughly consistent with the Court’s effort to establish 
an institutionalist approach to the Takings Clause that defers to the properly derived decisions of 
competent, settled institutions.  Nollan and Dolan can be read narrowly because judicial 
enforcement of the federal constitution is merely one institutional check among a web of public 
and private institutions that constrain local regulatory discretion.  The powerful constitutional 
protection that “nexus” and “proportionality” provide may be limited, but in their shadow public 
actors in state courts and legislatures and in local governments, as well as voters, property 
owners, developers, and homebuyers offer a more complex, responsive, and locally sensitive 
web of legal, political, and market controls than the broad, formal rules established in Nollan and 
Dolan.
ii
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1Introduction 
 
The regulatory takings doctrine, the Supreme Court declared in Lingle v. Chevron 
(2005), concerns the effects of a regulation on the incidents of property ownership.1 It serves 
as a constitutional protection against regulations that impose the functional equivalence to a 
classic taking of private property (an appropriation by the state or an ouster), and requires 
compensation for owners subject to such regulations.2 Just as significant as declaring what 
regulatory takings is, the Court in Lingle also declared what the doctrine is not: the regulatory 
takings doctrine does not serve as a judicial check on the validity or reasonableness of a 
regulation that effects a taking.3 The Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution4 corrects an 
unfair outcome of the government’s regulation, but does not authorize substantive judicial 
review of government’s discretionary decision to regulate.5
In the same term that the Court explained the Takings Clause in this apparently 
coherent manner,6 it also took a revealing glance at its “exactions” jurisprudence—revealing 
not only for what the Court said about exactions, but also for what the Court revealed about 
its relative deference to the web of government institutions that shape land use regulation on 
the ground.7 A product of its two earlier decisions in Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission (1987)8 and Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994),9 the Court’s exactions rules limit 
what a regulatory agency (typically a local government) engaged in land use control can exact 
 
1 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
2 Id. at 537. 
3 Id. at 540-547. 
4 U.S. Const. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation”). 
5 See infra notes 126-130.  Obviously, the Takings Clause incidentally limits governmental discretion to 
have particular effects on property, but this is a secondary issue.  The Takings Clause does not directly affect the 
government’s authority to regulate; it merely requires that once the regulation has particular effects, the 
government must compensate for the losses associated with those effects. 
6 “Apparently coherent,” that is, in relation to the doctrine’s prior manifest incoherence—one that the 
Court recognized a generation ago, at the beginning of the modern era of regulatory takings, and that has 
persisted to the present.  See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978) (identifying 
a regulatory taking “has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty”); Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of 
Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 93, 97 n.2 (2002) (citing the extensive law review 
literature complaining of the doctrine’s incoherence).  
7 In this Article, I will use the general term “exactions” to refer to all conditions on development, 
including the dedication of land, fees in lieu of dedication, or impact fees.  I will occasionally use the term 
“impact fee” to refer to a type of exaction: monetary conditions on development intended to address directly a 
particular anticipated impact from the proposed development.  See also infra note 31 (listing and explaining 
other types of exactions).  But because this article concerns the Supreme Court’s broad, abstract approach to 
development conditions, I will generally use the term “exaction” rather than confuse the constitutional issue with 
more precise regulatory terminology. 
8 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
9 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
2from a property owner as a condition for development.10 Put briefly, the Court’s holdings in 
those decisions restricted the government to conditions, or “exactions,” that have an “essential 
nexus” to the harm expected from the proposed development,11 and that create a burden on 
the property owner that is in “rough proportionality” to that harm.12 Any exaction that fails to 
meet either of these tests requires the government to compensate the property owner for the 
property that the exaction has taken.13 Nollan and Dolan thereby limit and channel the 
regulatory discretion of local governments, acting as an external check on a land use planning 
process that a majority of the justices considered prone to exploitation.14 
The exactions decisions thus sit uneasily alongside the Court’s recent effort in Lingle 
to make sense of its long, confusing line of takings decisions.  On the one hand, Nollan and 
Dolan look to the particular effect that a condition will have on a property owner, and to that 
extent work consistently with the Court’s takings jurisprudence; on the other hand, they 
consider the validity of the relationship between the condition and the government’s stated 
regulatory purpose, and therefore require judicial review of a local government’s substantive 
regulatory practice as well as of the justification local officials use to explain its regulation.  It 
is no wonder, then, that Justice O’Connor attempted to reconcile the Court’s emergent takings 
theory with its exactions decisions in a final, separate part of her unanimous decision in 
Lingle.15 The exactions decisions, she asserted, are no more than a limited check on 
governmental efforts to impose, via a regulatory condition, a confiscatory or functionally 
equivalent taking of property without compensation in an individualized regulatory act; 
accordingly, under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, when the government has taken 
land without compensation, judicial review must check the relationship between the taking 
and the government’s stated regulatory need.16 Nollan and Dolan, in this explanation, apply 
to a limited universe of potential exactions.  When they do not apply, courts review a 
challenged exaction using some lower level of scrutiny, either the Court’s own ad hoc, multi-
 
10 By “exaction rules” I mean that Nollan and Dolan were efforts to impose clear and stable rule-formalist 
constraints on lower courts and local governments.  See Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism, Regulatory 
Formulas: Exactions and the Consequences of Clarity,” 92 CAL. L. REV. 609, 629-35 (2004); cf. JIM ROSSI,
REGULATORY BARGAINING AND PUBLIC LAW 107-09 (2005) (praising Nollan and Dolan for bringing certainty to 
regulatory process through their use of more precise formal rules than the balancing standards that dominate 
takings jurisprudence). 
11 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. 
12 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 
13 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 396; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831. 
14 This concern was clearest when Justice Scalia, in his Nollan decision, characterized any exaction that 
failed to advance the police powers objectives the government sought to further as “an out-and-out plan of 
extortion”—a characterization that Chief Justice Rehnquist repeated in Dolan. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (internal 
quotation and citation omitted); Dolan, 512 U.S. at 387; see generally Lee Ann Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real 
Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1, 15 (2000) (noting the Court’s skepticism about local 
governmental regulation in its exactions decisions). 
15 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545-548. 
16 Id. at 546-548. 
3factor balancing test from Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,17 or, more 
likely, an exactions-specific test developed by state courts under state law.18 
If only this explanation ended the saga.  Because Lingle’s entire discussion of Nollan 
and Dolan could be dismissed as non-binding dicta,19 and because the Court refused to 
provide further and more explicit clarity despite its opportunity to do so in a case for which it 
accepted review of another, separate takings question,20 some of the precise boundaries and 
implications of the exactions decisions remain uncertain.  The Court’s exactions rules check 
government discretion sometimes and in some ways, while leaving it up to other 
governmental institutions, as well as to developers, homeowners, voters, and the market for 
local governments’ packages of taxes and services, to check discretion over exactions to 
which Nollan and Dolan do not apply.  For many commentators, and even for some justices, 
this unevenness and confusion are untenable: heightened scrutiny should apply either to all 
exactions or to none.21 
In fact, this Article argues, Lingle affirms and justifies this unevenness—although its 
explanation may frustrate those property rights advocates on one side and planning advocates 
on the other who view the Court’s exactions jurisprudence as either an inadequate or an 
onerous effort to limit local discretion.  Lingle marks the Court’s ultimate shift in its 
regulatory takings jurisprudence towards viewing the Takings Clause as a constitutional 
command to respect institutional competence.  It focuses on the question of who should 
decide the limits of a regulatory burden on property rights rather than on the substantive issue 
of what a federal constitutional definition of property rights should be, and it affirms the 
passive virtue of deference.22 It thus clarifies that the Takings Clause serves as a shield for 
property owners only in those limited instances in which a regulatory agency imposes certain 
types of exactions in certain ways, thereby confiscating land in a manner that is highly 
suspect.  This appears to leave local governments with a significant degree of discretion 
outside of those instances when confiscatory exactions are most likely to be imposed.  But 
other institutions, most prominently state legislatures and courts, can limit local discretion. 
And they do—even more so now since exactions have become more widely used as a 
 
17 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Lingle made plain that when a 
special category did not exist, Penn Central applies.  Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546-48. 
18 See infra text accompanying notes 40-41, 177-180 (describing different levels of scrutiny applied by 
state courts under state law). 
19 See infra text accompanying notes 143-144. 
20 See infra Part II.A (discussing the questions presented in the petition for certiorari in San Remo Hotel, 
L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005)). 
21 Compare J. David Breemer, The Evolution of the "Essential Nexus": How State and Federal Courts 
Have Applied Nollan and Dolan and Where They Should Go from Here, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 373, 397-401 
(2002) (arguing that Nollan and Dolan’s heightened scrutiny should apply to all exactions) with Frank 
Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1607-08 (1988) (arguing that read narrowly, Nollan does 
not create a special category of heightened scrutiny for exactions, but merely extends the longstanding 
compensation requirement for unconditional permanent physical occupations to occupations that are imposed 
conditionally). 
22 See Mark Fenster, Takings, Version 2005: The Legal Process of Constitutional Property Rights, 9 U. 
PENN. J. CON. L. ____ (forthcoming, 2006). 
4regulatory tool.23 Ultimately, in its relatively late arrival to exactions and its uneven 
application to policing them, the Court has contributed to a complicated web of institutional 
restraints on local government.  Lingle affirms that the Takings Clause only authorizes a 
minimal role, though an occasionally powerful one, in this web of institutions that oversee or 
otherwise limit local discretion. 
 
This Article seeks not to praise Nollan and Dolan, nor to revere Lingle’s efforts to 
clarify those earlier decisions’ limits.  The exactions decisions are conceptually, normatively, 
and consequentially unsatisfactory,24 while Lingle itself improves upon and clarifies, but does 
not fully resolve, many of the doctrinal and regulatory messes the Court has created in the last 
three decades of its regulatory takings decisions.  Rather, this Article explains Lingle and the 
web of institutional restraints on exactions that it invokes as an imperfect but ultimately 
satisfactory solution to controlling local discretion in a post-Nollan and -Dolan world.  Lingle 
signals both that lower courts should limit Nollan and Dolan’s application and that other 
levels of government, acting outside the control of the Court’s exactions rules but within the 
shadow they cast, can limit—and indeed, frequently have limited—municipalities’ discretion 
to impose exactions.25 
* * *
Parts I and II of this Article describe exactions and the judicial review of exactions prior to the 
2004 Term. This history has already been described extensively;26 my purpose in these two 
parts is to focus upon how exactions work as a means to exercise regulatory discretion and 
how judicial review acts as one means to limit and channel that discretion.  After describing 
the rise of exactions in land use regulation, Part I concludes that exactions are appreciably less 
than perfect but are nevertheless necessary as a regulatory tool that enables the granting of 
entitlements to develop land while forcing at least some cost internalization as a condition of 
those entitlements.  Part II summarizes Nollan and Dolan and concludes that these decisions 
are also appreciably less than perfect but may be necessary as a means to protect landowners 
from oppressive conditions imposed by local governments.  Part III explains what the Court 
said and did not say about exactions in its 2004 Term, and Part IV attempts both to make 
sense of the Court’s actions and to justify the limitations the Court has placed on Nollan and 
Dolan’s application by describing other institutions and legal authorities that can effectively 
check local discretion. 
23 See infra Part IV.A-C 
24 See infra Part II.C. 
25 See infra Part III.B. 
26 See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 341-51 (1995); 
Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions:  Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions 
Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473 (1991); David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened 
Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1243 (1997); Fennell, supra note 14; Fenster, supra note 10; Ronald H. Rosenberg, 
The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation: Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV.
177 (2006). 
5I.  Exactions, Pre-2005:  The Rise of Regulatory Discretion 
A. Exactions and the Emergence of Local Administrative Discretion 
When owners seek to subdivide their parcels, initiate major construction projects, or 
intensify the use of their land, they typically must seek one or more discretionary approvals 
from the jurisdiction’s zoning authority or legislative body.27 The exercise of governmental 
discretion at the approval stage was not originally part of the “Euclidean” approach to zoning, 
which relied upon static zoning maps and ordinances either to authorize as a matter of right or 
ban entirely certain types of land uses in certain identified areas.28 In contemporary practice, 
however, local governments typically retain some degree of discretion in their comprehensive 
plans and zoning ordinances to approve or reject proposals from developers and property 
owners.29 
Over the past three decades,30 exactions have served as a flexible regulatory tool 
government authorities use as a condition for issuing approvals, especially in fast-growing 
communities.31 Exactions require property owners to provide some entitlement, promise, or 
fee that serves a public need and is related in some way to the expected external costs to the 
community of the owner’s new use of her land.32 If the property owner refuses, the local 
government can reject the development proposal under its police power authority—subject to 
liability, of course, for any violation of constitutional or state law.  In this way, exactions are, 
in William Fischel’s words, “payments for permissions that can be withheld.”33 In the 
 
27 See ALAN A. ALTSHULER & JOSE A. GOMEZ-IBANEZ, REGULATION FOR REVENUE: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF LAND USE EXACTIONS 54-55 (1993); Daniel J. Curtin, Jr., How the West Was Won: Takings and 
Exactions—California Style, in TRENDS IN LAND USE LAW FROM A TO Z, 193, 225-26 (Patricia E. Salkin ed., 
2001).  
28 See Ira Michael Heyman, Legal Assaults on Municipal Land Use Regulation, 5 URB. L. 2 (1973), 
reprinted in THE LAND USE AWAKENING: ZONING LAW IN THE SEVENTIES 51 (Robert H. Freilich & Eric O. 
Stuhler eds., 1981); “Euclidean zoning,” in A GLOSSARY OF ZONING, DEVELOPMENT, AND PLANNING TERMS 94 
(Fay Dolnick & Michael Davidson eds., American Planning Association Planning Advisory Service Report No. 
491/492, 1999). 
29 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 86, 90-92 (3d ed. 2005). 
30 One could date exactions to the imposition of subdivision controls that began in the early years of 
zoning and especially in the post-Depression era, when local governments, who had been saddled with poorly 
planned and financed subdivisions after the collapse of the 1902s land boom, began to require new development 
to provide at least parts of the infrastructure it would need.  See Rosenberg, supra note 26, at 198-204.  But their 
prevalence has grown dramatically during the post-war suburban boom period, as has the scope of projected 
costs they have been used to offset.  
31 See Vicki Been, Impact Fees and Housing Affordability, 8 CITYSCAPE 139, 142 (2005).  The term 
“exactions” includes, among other types, the dedication of land for the siting of public services or amenities 
(such as schools or parks), fees in lieu of dedication, impact fees to fund the provision of public services, and 
linkages, off-site development impact exactions intended to address effects linked to an approved development, 
such as the increased need for affordable housing that might result from commercial and/or office development.  
See Been, supra note 26, at 475-76 (1989); Thomas W. Ledman, Local Governmental Environmental Mitigation 
Fees: Development Exactions, The Next Generation, 45 FLA. L. REV. 835, 842-53 (1993); Theodore C. Taub, 
Exactions, Linkages, and Regulatory Takings: The Developer’s Perspective, 20 URB. LAW. 515, 524 (1988). 
32 See MICHAEL J. MESHENBERG, THE ADMINISTRATION OF FLEXIBLE ZONING TECHNIQUES 3-4 (American 
Society of Planning Officials Planning Advisory Service Report No. 318, 1976); Carol M. Rose, Planning and 
Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837, 879-80 (1983). 
33 WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 6 (2001). 
6process of imposing exactions, a local government may apply a pre-existing set of criteria or 
formulas to the property owner’s proposal in order to derive the exactions it will require, or it 
may negotiate with the property owner over the types and extent of exactions it will impose.34 
By using exactions to require financial or in-kind provision of infrastructure that will at 
minimum remedy the proposed project’s anticipated negative impacts, local governments 
have sought to shift to new development the infrastructural and service costs that such 
development would otherwise create—costs that would otherwise fall to the municipalities 
(and, in turn, to existing residents).35 
Exactions, in short, are key regulatory tools in a localized, discretionary regime in 
which elected and appointed government officials wield significant power over one of the key 
political, social, and fiscal issues facing local government: land development.36 The 
American model of governance views such administrative discretion with great skepticism, 
and only vests the authority to exercise such discretion with structural and formal constraints.  
Such constraints range from the checks and balances of the tri-partite federal system and the 
limited authority that local governments enjoy as subsidiary agents of the states that create 
them, to the substantive and procedural constraints placed on governmental authorities by 
constitutional and statutory texts.37 Not surprisingly, then, long before the Supreme Court 
jumped into the fray in Nollan and Dolan, other levels of government had sought to check 
municipal discretion to impose exactions.38 This occurred both implicitly, through state court 
decisions holding that local governments lacked sufficient authority to set such conditions on 
development or that the conditions violated an applicable state constitutional provision, and 
 
34 See DANIEL P. SELMI & JAMES A. KUSHNER, LAND USE REGULATION 160-63 (2d ed. 2004).   
35 See ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 27, at 7, 62-63, 77, 95-96.  On the growing 
infrastructural deficit and financial crunch that local governments face, and the limited alternatives they have to 
exactions, see id. at 17, 23-26; Paul P. Downing & Thomas S. McCaleb, The Economics of Development 
Exactions, in DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS 43, 44-50 (James E. Frank & Robert M. Rhodes eds., 1987); 
Rosenberg, supra note 26, at 183-91. On the “fiscalization” of land use decisions generally, see Jonathan 
Schwartz, Prisoners of Proposition 13: Sales Taxes, Property Taxes, and the Fiscalization of Municipal Land 
Use Decisions, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 183 (1997). 
36 See Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. the Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism from the 
Attack on “Monarchism” to Modern Localism, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 74, 95 (1990).  The near-autonomy of local 
governments in the administrative of land use in their jurisdiction, and the significance of land use regulation to 
local governance, has largely withstood efforts by state government to rein in local control.  See DAVID R. 
BERMAN, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE STATES 33-35 (2003). 
37 On the history of limits on federal agency discretion, see generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 213-46 (1992); (detailing the development of a 
proceduralist administrative law to check administrative agencies); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND 
THE NEW DEAL 94-127 (2000) (detailing the debates over the constitutional checks on the emergent federal 
administrative state in the early twentieth century).  On the history of limits placed on local government 
discretion by state government, see generally GERALD FRUG, CITY MAKING 45-50 (1999); BERMAN, supra note 
36, at 144-47.  On the complicated relationship between the federal government and local governments, 
including the underlying constitutional issue of federalism, see David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New 
Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J.377 (2001); Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: The Jurisprudence of 
Federal-Local Collaboration, manuscript draft on file with author. 
38 See R. Marlin Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Requirements to Community Benefit Assessments 
and Linkage Payments: A Brief History of Land Development Exactions, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 9-19 
(1987). 
7explicitly, through state statutes that authorized but set limits on such conditions.39 Prior to 
Nollan, state courts had relied upon their own state constitutional, statutory, and common law 
doctrines to develop various standards of review for land use exactions; some of those 
imposed a form of heightened, or even strict, scrutiny on exactions, while others were far 
more deferential.40 Indeed, the Supreme Court claimed to base its rough proportionality test 
in Dolan on what it found to be the most reasonable of the state court precedent.41 
B. The Imperfections of Exactions 
 
As a regulatory tool, exactions promise an efficient means to force new development 
to “pay its own way” by internalizing its anticipated external costs.42 Exactions thereby 
appear to represent an exemplary tool of “smart growth,” insofar as they enable an expansion 
of residential housing supply at its true cost without burdening the existing community.43 In 
theory, if an omniscient, omnipotent, and fair local government could design and implement 
perfect conditions on development, the resulting regulatory acts would be models of 
efficiency; they would be achieved with minimal administrative costs, and would easily pass 
the nexus and proportionality tests.44 These hyper-efficient exactions would be so perfect, in 
fact, that they would likely garner a broad democratic consensus among the citizenry—after 
all, the new development would simultaneously increase the local tax base and reveal a 
welcoming, inclusive community—all without imposing any burden on the citizenry. 
 
39 See, e.g., City of Montgomery v. Crossroads Land Co., 355 So. 2d 363 (Ala. 1978) (invalidating as 
beyond statutory authority fees imposed in lieu of park land dedication); Haugen v. Gleason, 359 P.2d 108, 111 
(Or. 1961) (invalidating fee imposed on residential developers in lieu of park land dedication because failure of 
ordinance to limit use of funds to benefit made the fee a tax, which the county had no statutory authority to 
impose); see generally John J. Delaney et al., The Needs-Nexus Analysis: A Unified Test for Validating 
Subdivision Exactions, User Impact Fees and Linkage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 146 & n.49 (Winter 
1987) (citing cases in which courts invalidated exactions for lack of statutory authority).   
40 See generally Delaney et al., supra note 39, at 146-56 (summarizing differing state approaches pre-
Nollan). 
41 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389-91 (summarizing various state approaches to the relationship between the 
exaction and the proposed development); but see Matthew J. Cholewa & Helen L. Edmonds, Federalism and 
Land Use After Dolan: Has the Supreme Court Taken Takings from the States? 28 URB. LAW. 401, 415-16 
(1996) (arguing that Court misread many of the state court decisions it summarized in Dolan). 
42 See, e.g., ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, supra note 27, at 3-4; Gus Bauman & William H. Ethier, 
Development Exactions and Impact Fees: A Survey of American Practices, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 52 
(1987); Stewart E. Sterk, Competition Among Municipalities As a Constraint on Land Use Exactions, 45 VAND.
L. REV. 831, 832 (1992); Edward J. Sullivan & Isa Lester, The Role of the Comprehensive Plan in Infrastructure 
Financing, 37 URB. LAW. 53, 61 (2005) 
43 See J. Celeste Sakowicz, Urban Sprawl: Florida’s and Maryland’s Approaches, 19 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 377, 395-96 (2003); Samuel R. Staley, Reforming the Zoning Laws, in A GUIDE TO SMART GROWTH:
SHATTERING MYTHS, PROVIDING SOLUTIONS 61, 73 (Jane S. Shaw & Ronald D. Utt eds., 2000); Michael Allan 
Wolf, Earning Deference: Reflections on the Merger of Environmental and Land-Use Law, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. 
REV. 253, 263 (2002). 
44 See Stewart E. Sterk, Nollan, Henry George, and Exactions, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1731, 1732-36 (1988) 
(positing that a sufficiently comprehensive exaction program could be efficient).  On the omniscient model in 
land use planning, see Neil Komesar, Housing, Zoning, and the Public Interest, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN
ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 218, 220-21 (Burton A. Weisbrod ed. 1978).  
8But of course local governments are neither omniscient nor omnipotent.45 They rely 
on imperfect information and guesswork about the expected externalized costs of 
development—albeit expensive, professionally derived information and guesswork—to 
impose exactions that are inevitably imperfect.46 Nor do exactions capture the full range of 
impacts for new development, as non-omnipotent local governments frequently either shy 
away from imposing full-cost exactions or are barred from doing so by their state 
legislatures.47 Exactions focus almost entirely on infrastructure and are only rarely used to 
consider socio-economic issues such as housing and employment needs that comprehensive 
planning otherwise considers.48 And where inexpert and lenient exactions appear to give a 
relatively free pass to developers that have captured the local government’s regulatory 
process, exactions can appear to encourage weak, potentially corrupt bargains that enable 
development while passing its costs onto the community.49 
Exactions also create distributional inequities.  Some commentators and economists 
have asserted that the costs of exactions, once passed along to new homeowners, make 
housing less affordable to those who can least afford it—although the evidence about the 
relationship between impact fees and housing costs is mixed.50 Exactions can also make the 
local allocation of resources more unequal.  Exactions are popular with local governments 
because they produce non-tax revenue that can finance capital construction and public 
services at a time when municipalities with limited taxing authority face increasing fiscal 
obligations.51 Local governments’ reliance on exactions to finance infrastructure and services 
has helped transform municipalities into quasi-private, pay-as-you-go service providers.  As a 
 
45 See Sterk, supra note 44, at 1738-42. 
46 See DANIEL POLLAK, CALIFORNIA STATE LIBRARY, HAVE THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S 5TH 
AMENDMENT TAKINGS DECISIONS CHANGED LAND USE PLANNING IN CALIFORNIA? 125-29 (2000); Fenster, 
supra note 10, at 644. 
47 See POLLAK, supra note 46, at 23-25; Jonathan M. Davidson et al., “Where's Dolan?” Exactions Law in 
1998, 30 URB. LAW. 683, 697 (1998); Fenster, supra note 10, at 654-61; Laurie Reynolds & Carlos A. Ball, 
Exactions and the Privatization of the Public Sphere, 21 J.L. & POL. 451, 471 (2005).  For example, the city of 
Albuquerque, New Mexico waited nearly a decade after receiving statutory authority to impose impact fees to 
adopt a formula for their use due to developers’ opposition.  See Anita P. Miller, New Mexico Development 
Impact Fees, in DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES IN THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN REGION 57, 67 (J. Bart Johnson & James 
van Hemert ed., 2d ed. 2005). Moreover, even presuming the possibility of perfect information and a willing and 
powerful government, a “perfect” exaction presumes a universally recognizable community baseline from which 
new development’s costs are taking the community and to which exactions will return the community.  See 
Fennell, supra note 14, at 65. 
48 See Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, The Legal Issues of Capital Facilities Funding, in PRIVATE SUPPLY 
OF PUBLIC SERVICES 51, 63 (Rachelle Alterman ed., 1988). 
49 On the problems of bias, capture, and corruption in the land use process, see ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra 
note 29, at 364-69; Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 45, 86-
88 (1994).  In the period prior to the widespread delegation to local governments of authority to impose 
exactions, courts frequently struck down as illegal “contract zoning” those land use bargains that manifested 
excessive agency capture or corruption.  See Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: 
Contract Zoning, Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land Use Deals,
65 N.C. L. REV. 957, 977-94 (1987). 
50 See Arthur C. Nelson, Development Impact Fees: The Next Generation, in EXACTIONS, IMPACT FEES 
AND DEDICATIONS 87, 93-94 (Robert H. Freilich & David W. Bushek eds., 1995);   
51 See Reynolds & Ball, supra note 47, at 458-59. 
9result, new services and infrastructure go disproportionately to those who can afford it; those 
who would depend upon the allocation of general tax revenues for the provision of public 
facilities and services and who cannot afford the incremental costs required to pay for them 
ultimately receive less.52 And local government that bases its allocation decisions 
increasingly on putatively unbiased, scientific efforts to internalize external costs becomes 
less participatory and less interested in furthering the principles of collective, community-
based decision-making that proponents of democratic cities advocate.53 
Nor are local governments always fair in their dealings with their citizens, much less 
with outsiders to whom they have little incentive to be fair.  The well-known, general 
critiques of local government as majoritarian, factional, and exclusive are common rebuttals 
to the progressive and civic republican ideal of a rational, deliberative local government.54 
These critiques attack exactions as inefficient because they not only add to the cost of housing 
but also force development to outlying suburbs and exurbs that impose fewer regulation—
thereby creating “leapfrog” development and sprawl.55 Critics also condemn exactions as an 
extortionate tool in an already burdensome land use planning process that results in a 
regulatory program that enables local governments to withhold valuable entitlements from 
individual developers and property owners unless the latter groups are willing to “exchange” 
outrageous and unfair fees or demands for the dedication of land.56 And this extortion in turn 
harms outsiders who are excluded from economically and racially homogenous suburbs by 
making new development more expensive.57 Viewed this way, exactions cause more 
problems than they solve.  
 
52 See id. at 456. 
53 See Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 35-45 (1998).  In this respect, criticism of the 
putatively unbiased efforts to impose cost-benefit analysis on environmental law applies to exactions as well.  
See David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral? 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335. 384-85 (2006) (finding that 
the use of putatively “neutral” cost-benefit analysis in environmental regulation can in fact demonstrate 
significant anti-regulatory bias). 
54 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 104 (1985) (advocating strict application of Takings Clause because 
without compensation requirement, regulation of property inevitably leads to government rent-seeking 
behavior); Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use 
Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 705-11, 761-79 (1973) (identifying “fundamental weaknesses” in zoning, and 
proposing development of a “more privatized system of land use regulation); Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the 
Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning with Private Collective Property Rights to Existing 
Neighborhoods, in THE VOLUNTARY CITY 307, 353-56 (David T. Beito et al. eds., 2002) (calling for 
privatization of zoning functions within neighborhood associations as a means to dismantle the coercive legacy 
of planning and land use controls). 
55 See FISCHEL, supra note 33, at 229-31 (developers’ preference for underdeveloped and under-regulated 
land, and homeowners’ preference for low-density zoning, leads to sprawl and “leapfrog” development). 
56 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (internal quotation and citation omitted) (characterizing an exaction that is 
unrelated to the harms likely to be caused by a proposed developed constitute “an out-and-out plan of 
extortion”); see also Carlos A. Ball & Laurie Reynolds, Exactions and Burden Distribution in Takings Law, 47 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1513, 1556-57 (2006) (arguing that exactions frequently require newcomers to pay for 
services and infrastructure that existing residents had received for free); Sterk, supra note 44, at 1744-47 
(arguing that exactions lead to governmental rent seeking). 
57 See, e.g., Mark Edward Braun, Suburban Sprawl in Southeastern Wisconsin: Planning, Politics, and the 
Lack of Affordable Housing, in SUBURBAN SPRAWL: CULTURE, THEORY, AND POLITICS 264-65 (Matthew J. 
Lindstrom & Hugh Bartling eds., 2003) (arguing that impact fees contribute to residential class segregation); but 
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Of course, such complaints about exactions’ effectiveness, fairness, and efficiency can 
apply to any regulatory device employed by any regulatory agency, much less any particular 
tool of land use regulation.58 And it is unclear as a predictive matter precisely how exactions’ 
flaws play out on the regulatory ground—whether imperfect information, high administrative 
costs, political and legal limits on local authority, inexpert or corrupt regulatory practices, and 
unfair and exclusionary decision-making lead in any particular case to more or less regulation 
than the hypothetical ideal of the “perfect” exaction.59 But these flaws certainly make it less 
likely that something approaching regulatory perfection can ever be achieved. 
 
These criticisms suggest three alternative responses.  First, when encompassed within 
a general, libertarian dismissal of local land use regulation, a critique of exactions as 
inefficient and extortionate counsels a complete dismantling of local planning, insofar as all 
of exactions’ regulatory imperfections and unfairness are symptomatic of the broader 
impossibility and failure of planning as a governmental project.60 Prohibit planning, in other 
words, and exactions—and the problems they cause—will no longer exist.  A second response 
suggests that local governments can retain the authority to engage in planning and land use 
regulation, but they should not have the authority to impose conditions on approvals.61 
Planning is not the problem; it is the discretionary authority to grant conditional approvals and 
exact money and land that perverts an otherwise effective regulatory process.  A third 
response asserts that a proper and effective land use planning regime would channel 
discretionary authority to impose exactions towards particular types of defensible, fair 
conditions imposed through fair procedures.62 Exactions are indeed imperfect, but they are 
superior to an inflexible growth-control system; and some external authority, preferably a 
higher level of government such as state legislatures or the federal or state judiciary, can 
effectively police local governments who have the authority to impose exactions. 
 
see Been, supra note 31, at 146-47 (citing efforts to study whether growth management and impact fees are 
intended to cause, or in fact cause, exclusion of low-income or minority consumers, but finding mixed evidence). 
58 As the editors of an administrative law casebook cogently demonstrate, generalized critiques of any 
regulatory agency—as well as of any substantive law or regulations they promulgate—frequently proceed at a 
high level of abstraction, proceed from the critics’ sympathy or hostility to the agency’s substantive efforts, and 
tend to whipsaw an agency by condemning it from both sides at once (such as by complaining both that it is 
subject to capture by regulated parties and insufficiently responsive to the needs of regulated parties).  See JERRY 
L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 30-32 (5th ed. 2003).  Local 
governmental efforts to regulate land use and their use of exactions face the same fate. 
59 See generally Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 166-68 (1998) (arguing that general theories of regulation fail to explain satisfactorily the 
“facts-on-the-ground” of regulation). 
60 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 181 (1993). 
61 The closest the Court has come to indicating a disapproval of exactions as a practice appeared in a 
footnote in Nollan when Justice Scalia characterized unrelated exactions as a means by which local governments 
can play with their land use regulations to maximize the rents they seek from property owners.  See Nollan, 483 
U.S. at 837 n.5.  This position could lead to the conclusion that any ability to bargain with property owners using 
police powers represents an excess of authority.  Indeed, a similar concern drove the brief flurry of state cases 
that struck down land use bargains as “contract zoning,” where courts feared that the bargaining away of the 
police powers would lead to poor land use planning as well as corruption.  See supra note 49 and accompanying 
text. 
62 See ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 27, at 136-39. 
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The first alternative, which would prohibit planning entirely, will not occur in the 
short term, given the political popularity of land use regulation and the longstanding existence 
of the legal authority to engage in it—especially after the failure of property rights advocates 
to curtail that authority through their concerted effort to develop a powerful regulatory takings 
doctrine.63 The second alternative, which would prohibit or severely curtail exactions, is 
equally unlikely to occur, given the crucial regulatory and ideological role that exactions play 
in helping to bring flexibility to an otherwise inflexible process by ameliorating the negative 
consequences of controversial new development proposals and persuading political opposition 
to accept them.64 At this point in the history of planning, exactions are too widely used and 
important to the operation of land use controls to be prohibited.  The third alternative—to 
limit and channel discretion and correct instances in which the discretion is abused or 
exactions produce unacceptably adverse consequences—has been, and will continue to be, the 
focus of efforts to manage exactions, and was the one chosen by the Supreme Court in Nollan 
and Dolan.
II. The Constitutionalization of Exactions, Pre-2005: Nollan and Dolan.
A. Nollan and Dolan 
 
Nollan and Dolan upheld exactions as a general proposition while they raised the 
baseline of protection in states where legislatures and courts had previously deferred to local 
governmental authority to impose exactions that effected takings without compensation.  Both 
decisions concerned property owners’ federal constitutional challenges to two similar 
exactions and resulted in two related tests.  In each, a single property owner (in neither case a 
developer) sought a discretionary approval from a local or regional agency to expand the use 
of their property.  And in each, the agency granted the approval on the condition that the 
property owner or owners open parts of their land to the public to offset the expected harms 
that the expanded uses would cause.   
 
The exaction in Nollan required the petitioners, who sought to replace a dilapidated 
beach bungalow with a larger house, to dedicate an easement across their beachfront.  The 
easement would serve as part of a network of lateral easements across private sections of the 
beach, enabling the public to walk to a public beach a short distance away.65 The California 
Coastal Commission, which has jurisdiction over development in the coastal area and had 
imposed the condition, sought the easement in order to offset the adverse impacts the house 
would have on the public’s visual access to the beach.66 The Supreme Court held that the 
 
63 This failure has been widely noted on the right and left.  See Eric R. Claeys, Takings and Private 
Property on the Rehnquist Court, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 187 (2004) (conservative natural property rights advocate 
expressing profound disappointment in Rehnquist Court’s efforts to expand property rights); Joseph L. Sax, 
Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN.
L. REV. 1433, 1437-38 (1993) (liberal environmentalist noting the limits of the Rehnquist Court’s efforts to 
reconstruct property and takings law). 
64 See NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS 110-11 (2001). 
65 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827-828. 
66 Id. at 828-829. 
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easement was constitutionally excessive as an exaction, and therefore required that 
compensation be awarded to the property owners because the easement was insufficiently 
connected to the harm that the Commission sought to address in imposing it.67 The Court 
characterized the constitutional requirement for the extent of this connection as an “essential 
nexus.”68 Visual access, the Commission’s stated objective, had virtually no nexus to the 
easement, which represented a drastic incursion into the owners’ right to exclude the public 
from their property.69 
The Court reached its conclusion in this manner.  Had the Commission simply taken 
the easement from the Nollans, the Takings Clause would have required that the Nollans be 
compensated.70 But so long as the Commission imposed an exaction that was clearly related 
to its police power authority and the permissible objectives it hoped to achieve under that 
authority, no compensation would have been required.71 In other words, local police power 
authority allows exactions that seek to pursue a legitimate objective, and the Takings Clause, 
under those circumstances, does not require compensation for a regulatory act with an 
essential nexus to that objective that otherwise results in a taking of property.  But the Takings 
Clause does not allow local governments to “extort” private property—by requiring exactions 
that either lack or are unrelated to a legitimate purpose—unless the property owner is 
compensated.  The Commission’s exaction in Nollan required compensation not simply 
because it took from the Nollans the essential property right to exclude the public, but because 
it used the Commission’s police power authority to take property without demonstrating that 
the taking had an essential nexus to the Commission’s actual objectives in exercising that 
authority.   
 
While Nollan concerned the qualitative “nexus” between an exaction and the 
government’s regulatory purpose, Dolan considered the quantitative proportionality between 
an exaction and the harms that the city of Tigard, Oregon, sought to mitigate by imposing the 
exaction.72 The property owner sought required permits from the city in order to expand her 
hardware store and the store’s parking lot.73 The city conditioned issuance of its permits on 
the property owner’s dedication to the public of both an undeveloped part of her land for a 
floodplain and an easement across her land for a bicycle path.74 As in Nollan, the city of 
Tigard would have been required to pay compensation if it had simply taken the land and 
easement for the bike path and floodplain.  But these exactions met Nollan’s test.  Flooding 
and traffic constitute legitimate police power concerns.75 In theory, the bike path would have 
served as part of a network of bike routes the city was piecing together and would have offset 
the anticipated increase in traffic from the store expansion.  The floodplain would offset the 
increase in impermeable surfaces on the owner’s land from the expanded structures and 
 
67 Id. at 836-837. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 841-842. 
71 Id. 
72 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
73 Id. at 379-380. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 384. 
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pavement, which would create additional flooding on her property and on neighboring land as 
well.   
 
Nevertheless, the Court held, these exactions required compensation because they 
required too much from the property owner—in the Court’s words, they lacked “‘rough 
proportionality’ both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”76 The 
Court found that the city had failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that these dedications 
were quantitatively necessary to mitigate the harms expected to result from the property’s 
expanded use.77 The floodplain did not need to be dedicated to the public in order to retain 
storm water, while the Court was unconvinced that dedication of the bike path was required to 
mitigate the anticipated increase in automobile traffic to and from the hardware store.  
Dolan’s rough proportionality test thus took its place, alongside Nollan’s essential nexus test, 
in the pantheon of regulatory takings tests.   
 
B. Uncertainty and Variability After Nollan and Dolan 
 
If the Court—or at least the groups of five justices who constituted the majorities of 
Nollan and Dolan78—considered its constitutional tests for exactions to be clear, authoritative, 
and likely to contain administrative discretion in imposing exactions, it was sorely mistaken.  
Prior to the Court’s oblique return to the exactions issue in its 2004 Term, four members of 
the Dolan majority had poured their frustrations over Nollan and Dolan’s failure to constrain 
land use regulation into dissents from denials of certiorari in two cases—in one of which 
Justice Scalia, joined by two of his colleagues, accused local governments and lower courts of 
willfully ignoring precedent.79 Whether the fault lay in the local political branches for 
refusing to respect federal constitutional limits on their discretion, or in federal and state 
judicial actors for failing to enforce those limits, or in the exactions decisions themselves, the 
decade between Dolan and the 2004 Term saw significant uncertainty among courts and 
litigants over how to identify the types of exactions to which heightened scrutiny applies.80 
One significant source of confusion, caused by the Court itself, has been the reach of 
the nexus and proportionality tests, an unresolved issue that created two questions the Court 
had failed to address directly before its 2004 Term.  First, do the nexus and proportionality 
 
76 Id. at 391. 
77 Id. at 394-395. 
78 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s decision in Dolan was joined by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and 
Thomas; Justice Scalia’s Nollan decision was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Powell, and 
O’Connor.  All five members of the Dolan majority were still on the Court for the 2005 takings decisions. 
79 See Lambert v. City and County of San Francisco, 529 U.S. 1045, 1045 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(joined by Justices Thomas and Kennedy); see also Parking Ass'n of Georgia v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200 
(Ga. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1116 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (joined by Justice O’Connor, arguing 
that Nollan and Dolan should apply to legislatively imposed exactions as well as individualized exactions). 
80 See Richard A. Epstein, The Harms and Benefits of Nollan and Dolan, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 477, 492 
(1995) (criticizing lower courts’ dislike of Nollan); Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Non-Impact of the United States 
Supreme Court Regulatory Takings Cases on the State Courts: Does the Supreme Court Really Matter?, 6
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 523, 555-56 (1995) (documenting lower courts’ record of failing to enforce Supreme 
Court takings decisions, including Nollan and Dolan). 
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requirements apply only to exactions that require the dedication of land for public use (as in 
the facts of Nollan and Dolan themselves), or do they extend to exactions such as impact fees 
or conservation easements that do not require the property owner to forfeit the right to 
exclude?81 Nollan and Dolan included language indicating that the land/ non-land distinction 
made a constitutional difference,82 but many lower courts had not considered the decisions to 
be limited to their narrow facts.83 Second, do Nollan and Dolan apply only to exactions 
imposed by adjudicative decisions imposing exactions on an individual piece of land, or do 
they extend also to legislative decisions imposing equivalent exactions on all development 
within an entire jurisdiction or larger units thereof?  On this question, the Court had indicated 
prior to its 2004 Term that this distinction makes a constitutional difference, and that only 
individualized exactions fall within the “special context” of exactions.84 But again, lower 
courts have not considered themselves bound by the Court’s language,85 and a sizeable 
minority of courts, with the support of some Supreme Court justices and commentators, has 
applied the nexus and proportionality tests to legislative exactions.86 The Court had produced 
tea leaves sufficient to produce speculation as to how it would settle the land/ non-land issue 
as recently as City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes (1999),87 but it had not settled either issue 
authoritatively by the time it decided Lingle—at least in part because the tea leaves it had 
produced five years earlier hinted in the opposite direction.88 
81 See Nancy E. Stroud, A Review of Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey and Its Implications for Local 
Government Exactions, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 195, 203-05 (1999). 
82 See generally Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (distinguishing Dolan, in which the challenged exaction required 
the property owner to dedicate part of her land to the city, from other regulatory takings cases applying different 
standards of review, in which the challenged regulations imposed conditions that were “simply a limitation on 
the use” the property owners made of their land); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841 noting that required dedications 
demand more careful judicial review because of the “heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the 
compensation requirement, rather than the stated police-power objective”).   
83 See Stroud, supra note 81, at 202-06 (discussing the split among courts on this point and possible 
implications of Del Monte Dunes). 
84 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (distinguishing between challenges to “essentially legislative determinations 
classifying entire areas of the city,” and the challenges reviewed in Dolan (and, by implication, Nollan), which 
were challenges to “adjudicative decision[s] to condition petitioner’s application for a building permit on an 
individual parcel”); see also id. at 391 n.8 (noting that judicial review of “an adjudicative decision to condition 
petitioner's application for a building permit on an individual parcel” applies heightened scrutiny and places the 
burden rests on the government entity to prove that an exaction did not effect a taking, as opposed to judicial 
review of “generally applicable zoning regulations,” which proceeds under a more relaxed scrutiny with the 
burden on the property owner to demonstrate that the exaction constitutes a taking). 
85 See Fenster, supra note 10, at 639 n.144 (citing cases). 
86 See, e.g., Parking Ass'n of Georgia v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200 (Ga. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 
1116 (1995) (Thomas & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting) (attacking the legislative/ adjudicative distinction as unclear, 
illogical, and essentially meaningless); Laurie Reynolds, Local Subdivision Regulation: Formulaic Constraints 
in an Age of Discretion, 24 GA. L. REV. 525, 544-49 (1990) (arguing that legislative/ adjudicative distinction is 
meaningless in the local context, where governments are smaller and their structures less formal); Inna Reznik, 
Note, The Distinction Between Legislative and Adjudicative Decisions in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 242, 260-61 (2000) (same). 
87 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999) (unanimous portion 
of majority opinion) (stating that the exactions rules apply only to those conditions for approval that require “the 
dedication of property to public use”).  Prior to Del Monte Dunes,
88 On the next business day after it issued its decision in Dolan, the Court directed the California Supreme 
Court to review, in light of Dolan, a California Court of Appeal decision that had applied a relatively low 
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C. The Imperfections of Nollan and Dolan 
While a number of commentators have praised Nollan and Dolan and have been 
disappointed only that the Court has not extended their tests more broadly,89 critics have 
complained of the decisions’ conceptual, normative, descriptive, and consequential flaws.90 
Indeed, the decisions are by no means perfect.  They simplify the local political, regulatory, 
and market contexts for imposing exactions, and fail to recognize the institutions that check 
local governmental discretion.91 When read broadly, the decisions assume that property 
owners are universally vulnerable to extortionate local governments and require broad 
protection against unconstitutional confiscations. Part IV of this Article describes the context 
that the Court’s caricature ignores as an institutional web within which land use regulation 
operates; suffice it to say here that the Court’s assumptions are overly simplistic.   
 
The Court’s failure to consider context and complexity in the local land use regulatory 
process led it to fashion prophylactic, formalistic rules in its nexus and proportionality tests 
that operate in isolation from a number of more relevant inquiries that would better focus on 
the extent to which an exaction unfairly took property from an individual.92 In the continuum 
of regulatory takings tests, the proportionality and nexus tests are closer to the mechanical 
rule for a permanent physical invasion (which always requires compensation) than to the 
indeterminate and multi-factor Penn Central balancing test.93 By definition, mechanical rules 
narrow the scope and sharpen the edge of judicial inquiry into complex regulatory 
transactions and as a result narrow the scope of regulatory discretion.94 In turn, these rules 
then narrow the exercise of administrative discretion when a regulatory agency, fearing the 
 
standard of review to impact fee exactions.  Ehrlich v. Culver City, 512 U.S. 1231 (1994).  The California 
Supreme Court, in turn, applied Nollan and Dolan to the exaction.  Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 
433 (Cal. 1996) (plurality opinion). 
89 See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 934, 963-64 (2003) (arguing in favor of extending Nollan and Dolan’s heightened means-ends test for 
“public use” inquiries in eminent domain litigation); Douglas W. Kmiec, Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces 
into the Takings Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1044-45 (1997) (arguing in favor of the nexus and 
proportionality tests’ general applicability for all regulatory takings cases); Jan G. Laitos, Causation and the 
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: Why the City of Tigard's Exaction Was a Taking, 72 DENV. U. L. REV.
893, 904-08 (1995) (arguing that the exactions decisions signaled that the Court was imposing a generalized 
“causation” test under the Takings Clause that would require compensation for any regulation that performs 
more than narrowly force cost-internalization on a land use’s negative externalities). 
90 See supra note 26 (listing commentaries critical of Nollan and Dolan). 
91 See Dana, supra note 26, at 1271-74; See Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 
1121, 1131-39 (1996) (reviewing FISCHEL, supra note 26). 
92 See ROSSI, supra note 10, at 107-08 (praising formalism in Nollan and Dolan). 
93 See Fenster, supra note 10, at 629. 
94 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED 
DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 145-49 (1991) (describing how rules narrow the focus of decision-
makers to limited set of concerns); Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules 
and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 822-23 (2002) (describing how the choice of rules or standards for 
the standard of judicial review of agency action affects agency behavior); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a 
Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989) (arguing that clear rules offer the advantages of uniform 
interpretation and predictable implementation). 
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possibility of litigation and the application of those mechanical rules to its regulatory 
decisions, follows the rule rather than its own conclusions regarding the wisest regulatory 
course.   
 
Because the Court misunderstood or ignored the regulatory field on which its 
exactions rules apply and failed to make clear when these rules apply, Nollan and Dolan have 
produced a number of unanticipated consequences—many of which adversely affect the rights 
of property owners as well as the discretion of government planning.95 In some jurisdictions, 
the Court’s protections and other pressures have helped contribute to instances in which local 
governments have placed minimal or no conditions on approvals for fear of exposing 
themselves to costly litigation, thereby enabling new development to push its costs on to 
existing residents.   But in jurisdictions that strongly support growth controls and enjoy a 
booming real estate market, local regulators have successfully avoided the Court’s 
constitutional commands and imposed exactions that were unrelated or arguably un-
proportional to a development project’s harms.96 And by limiting the type as well as the 
extent of exactions, Nollan and Dolan limit the universe of potential bargains and conditions 
that might effectively persuade local opposition to a proposed project—thereby limiting the 
freedom of property owners to trade property rights for regulatory entitlements and making it 
more likely that a local government will deny a project rather than bargain to a mutually 
acceptable exaction.97 
95 The paragraph that follows summarizes arguments and data presented in Fenster, supra note 10, at 652-
68. 
96 This can occur in two ways.  First, in overheated real estate markets local governments can simply not 
comply with Nollan and Dolan by dealing only with repeat-playing developers who are willing to suffer 
excessive exactions because of the profit margins of their proposed developments.  See Dana, supra note 26, at 
1286-94; Fenster, supra note 10, at 666-68.    
Second, local governments can utilize regulatory tools to which Nollan and Dolan may not apply.  For 
example, local governments can obtain exactions that might otherwise fail under Nollan and Dolan through 
development agreements, which are authorized in some states by statute, whereby the municipality agrees to 
freeze the regulatory requirements that will be applied to a development in exchange for the developer’s 
agreement to meet enumerated conditions (which may include the dedication of land).  See DANIEL R. 
MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 6.23 (5th ed. 2003).  Although such agreements would thereby impose a per se 
taking through an individualized exaction, proponents of development agreements argue that because they are 
voluntary, bilateral contracts, they should not be subject to nexus and proportionality tests under the Takings 
Clause.  See David L. Callies & Julie A. Tappendorf, Unconstitutional Land Development Conditions and the 
Development Agreement Solution: Bargaining for Public Facilities After Nollan and Dolan, 51 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 663, 692-93 (2001); Daniel J. Curtin, Jr., & Sanford M. Skaggs, Legal Issues and Considerations, in 
DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS: PRACTICE, POLICY, AND PROSPECTS 121, 130-31 (Douglas R. Porter & Lindell L. 
Marsh eds., 1989); Patricia Grace Hammes, Development Agreements: The Intersection of Real Estate Finance 
and Land Use Controls, 23 U. BALT. L. REV. 119, 158-59 (1995); but see Michael H. Crew, Development 
Agreements After Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 22 URB. LAW. 23, 50-55 (1990) (arguing that 
development agreements should be subject to Nollan); Wegner, supra note 49, at 1000 (arguing that 
development agreements are regulatory, rather than contractual).  Similar issues arise when exactions are 
required as part of annexation agreements.  See Peggy L. Cuciti, Exactions through Annexation Agreements: A 
Case Study, in PRIVATE SUPPLY OF PUBLIC SERVICES, supra note 48, at 238-44. 
97 FISCHEL, supra note 26, at 348-49; Been, supra note 26, at 497; Fennell, supra note 14, at 50; Jerold S. 
Kayden, Zoning for Dollars: New Rules for an Old Game? Comments on the Municipal Art Society and Nollan 
Cases, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 48 (1991). 
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By itself, Dolan might provide sufficient protection for a property owner; but if a 
jurisdiction would prefer some condition whose cost would be proportional to the anticipated 
harm but that lacks an “essential nexus,” it may turn down a project for fear of takings 
liability.  At the same time, in an effort both to regularize their exactions practice and take 
advantage of the presumption that Nollan and Dolan do not apply either to legislated or non-
possessory exactions, many local governments have adopted legislative, formulaic impact 
fees and relied more heavily on conditions requiring the payment of those fees rather on than 
the dedication of real property.98 Using this practice, local governments have pursued a more 
mechanical, less discretionary approach to land use regulation, and have foregone more open-
ended negotiations over a wider universe of possible exactions.  This practice, too, might limit 
the ability of property owners to negotiate an individualized exaction that would be more 
advantageous and attractive to both parties.   
 
These criticisms concern the decisions’ conceptual and consequential failings.  But 
Nollan and Dolan’s formalistic tests also appear to disregard important considerations that are 
typically part of regulatory takings inquiries.  They appear to ignore, or at least minimize the 
significance of, the fundamental Armstrong principle of regulatory takings99 that examines 
whether burdens are spread fairly throughout the community.100 It is possible, for example, 
that a permissible exaction under Nollan and Dolan imposes a burden on a property owner 
that was not imposed on others; it is also possible—indeed, the facts of Nollan at least 
indicate that this occurred with the lateral beach easement—that an unconstitutional exaction 
had already been widely imposed on others in the community.101 Thus, nexus and 
proportionality do not help identify instances in which a property owner has been unfairly 
singled out for a burdensome exaction.102 Nor do they help courts identify when a property 
owner who is subject to an exaction also gains a reciprocal advantage from the imposition of 
exactions on similarly situated members of the community.103 In Nollan and Dolan, for 
example, the property owners would have benefited from the positive network effects of 
 
98 See generally James C. Nicholas, Designing Proportionate-Share Impact Fees, in PRIVATE SUPPLY OF 
PUBLIC SERVICES, supra note 48, at 127, 130-34 (advocating use of formulaic fees that would survive judicial 
review); Reynolds & Ball, supra note 47, at 465-69. 
99 See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (declaring that the Takings Clause was 
“designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole”). 
100 See Ball & Reynolds, supra note 56, at 1547-53.  
101 See Nollan 483 U.S., at 829 (noting that 43 out of 60 coastal development permits along the same tract 
of land had included an identical beach easement as that challenged in Nollan, and that of the remaining 
property, 14 permits had been issued before the Commission had issued regulations enabling it to impose a 
condition and 3 did not have oceanfront property). 
102 See D.S. Pensley, Note, Real Cities, Ideal Cities: Proposing a Test of Intrinsic Fairness for Contested 
Development Exactions, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 699, 722-31 (2006) (incorporating from corporate law an “intrinsic 
fairness” test that would closely consider process and burden issues in individual cases). 
103 Justice Holmes originally suggested the “reciprocity of advantage” inquiry in Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), and has more recently been relied upon in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 341 (noting reciprocal advantages to all property owners from 
temporary moratorium), and in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987) 
(cited as a rationale for upholding state statute against a regulatory takings challenge because some of the 
statute’s benefits are likely to redound to property owner). 
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lateral beach easements and bike path easements that the government agencies were 
attempting to piece together.104 
In short, the Court’s exactions decisions failed to provide an effective constitutional 
approach to exactions; instead, they established overly simple rules that are inconsistent with 
at least some aspect of the Court’s regulatory takings doctrine—rules whose application is 
unclear and whose consequences are significantly less than perfect.  These imperfections and 
uncertainties were the legal context within which exactions returned to the Court, albeit 
obliquely, in Lingle v. Chevron.
III. Exactions, Version 2005: Lingle, San Remo Hotel, and the 2004 Term 
 
The Court granted petitions for certiorari in three takings cases for its 2004 Term, two 
of which concerned regulatory takings claims.105 But the Court avoided explicit 
reconsideration of its exactions jurisprudence when it could have done so directly, denying 
certiorari on an issue in a case it accepted,106 even as it restated its exactions rules in a 
different regulatory takings decision that did not itself concern an exaction.107 
A. San Remo Hotel: Takings Procedure Over Exactions Substance 
 
One of the three takings cases for which certiorari was granted in the 2004 Term 
actually concerned a challenge to an exaction.  The petition for certiorari filed by the plaintiffs 
in San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco presented two questions.108 The first 
raised a substantive issue concerning the applicability of Nollan and Dolan to exactions that 
are imposed through legislation rather than through more specific, individualized 
administrative processes.  The substantive issue arose from the hotel owners’ challenge to a 
$567,000 fee that San Francisco charged, under its Hotel Conversion Ordinance, for 
converting rooms in their hotel from residential to tourist use.109 The fee constituted a 
required, in-lieu contribution to the city’s effort to provide affordable housing and was 
intended to mitigate the impact that the loss of residential hotel units, which serve as housing 
predominantly for the poor, elderly, and disabled, would have on the city’s diminishing 
supply of affordable housing.110 The California Supreme Court, following Nollan and Dolan 
104 See Nollan, 483 U.S., at 856 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Ball & Reynolds, supra note 56, at 1554-59 
(identifying the reciprocity of advantage enjoyed by property owners the exactions challenged in Nollan and 
Dolan). 
105 The third takings decision famously considered the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment’s 
Takings Clause.  See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005) (the “public use” requirement for 
exercise of eminent domain under the Fifth Amendment did not bar city's exercise of eminent domain power in 
furtherance of an economic development plan that would result in acquired property’s use for private 
development). 
106 See infra Part III.A. 
107 See infra Part III.B. 
108 See Petition for Certiorari, San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 2004 WL 
2031862 (Sept. 7, 2004). 
109 See San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 95 (Cal. 2002). 
110 Id. at 91-92. 
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and its own precedent, held that the Supreme Court’s heightened nexus and proportionality 
requirements did not apply to the challenged fee because the housing replacement fee was 
based upon a statutorily created formula that was applied mechanically to the plaintiff’s 
proposed conversion.111 Instead, the California Supreme Court held, a more relaxed, 
“reasonable relationship” test applied, under which the fee survived both facial and as-applied 
challenges.112 
The substantive appeal thus raised one of the key issues left open in the Court’s 
exactions decisions and strenuously debated by lower courts and commentators in the 
intervening years: whether an exaction imposed by legislation rather than by individualized 
adjudication should be scrutinized under Nollan and Dolan or under some lower standard 
developed by state courts.113 But the Court granted certiorari only to consider the second 
question raised in the San Remo Hotel petition, which concerned issue preclusion in federal 
court when a state court had previously adjudicated a takings claim under state constitutional 
law.114 The Court’s decision in San Remo Hotel—holding that under the full faith and credit 
statute,115 a plaintiff whose federal regulatory takings claim is resolved by a state court under 
state takings law is precluded from re-litigating the claim in federal court116—only resolved 
the procedural and jurisdictional question and did not consider any substantive issues relating 
to exactions. 
 
B. Lingle and Exactions 
 
In the meantime, the Court had also granted certiorari to another regulatory takings 
case out of the Ninth Circuit, Lingle v. Chevron.117 Lingle concerned the viability under the 
Takings Clause of a test originally articulated in the Court’s 1980 decision in Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, which considered whether a regulation challenged under the Fifth Amendment’s 
Takings Clause “substantially advances a legitimate state interest.”118 Under Agins, this 
“substantially advances” test could stand alone as a basis for takings liability.119 The 
unanimous decision in Lingle held that the Agins test is appropriate only as the basis of a 
substantive due process claim and is unsuitable for adjudication of a takings claim.120 In the 
 
111 Id. at 104-05 (relying on Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996), as well as Nollan and 
Dolan). 
112 Id. at 105-11. 
113 Theoretically, the case could have raised the other open issue—whether heightened scrutiny applies to 
monetary exactions.  See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.  However, the California Supreme Court had 
settled that issue in its Ehrlich decision, and the issue was not raised in the U.S. Supreme Court.  See Ehrlich,
911 P.2d, at 433 (plurality opinion) (holding that Nollan and Dolan apply to an individualized monetary 
exaction). 
114 See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 543 U.S. 1032 (2004) (granting petition 
for certiorari as to only one question). 
115 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000). 
116 San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005). 
117 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 363 F.3d 846, 852 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 543 U.S. 924 (2004). 
118 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 531-533(reviewing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 
255, 260 (1980). 
119 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
120 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545-546. 
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process, the Court offered a comprehensive review of the Court’s takings jurisprudence and 
closed with a fairly extensive discussion of its exactions decisions in order to explain that 
Nollan and Dolan neither overlapped with nor depended upon the rejected test from Agins.121 
1. The Issue and Result in Lingle 
In Lingle, the Supreme Court considered an appeal by Hawaii to an adverse takings 
judgment requiring that gas companies be compensated for the losses they suffered from a 
legislative cap on the amount of rent that they could charge dealers to whom they leased their 
gas stations.122 The legislation was enacted in order to address concerns about the price 
effects of market concentration in retail gasoline sales in the state.123 The federal district 
court had applied the “substantially advances” test from Agins without considering the extent 
of the harm to the gas companies’ property rights, and inquired extensively into the purpose, 
wisdom, and likelihood of success of a legislative enactment.124 The Ninth Circuit affirmed 
both the lower court’s use of Agins and its judgment.125 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the “substantially advances” test did not 
belong within the limited range of inquiries that the Takings Clause has authorized.  These 
inquiries include, most prominently, tests that identify whether a regulation results in a 
“functional equivalent” to eminent domain—either by imposing a permanent physical 
invasion of private property or by diminishing entirely the property’s economic value,126 or by 
creating a lesser burden that nevertheless requires compensation under a multi-factor 
balancing test that considers, among other things, the extent of the diminution in the 
property’s value and the frustration of the owner’s reasonable investment-backed 
expectations.127 The Agins test, by contrast, had allowed a property owner to allege that a 
regulatory act effected a taking solely on the basis of the character of the government’s action, 
and without reference to whether the act had any effect on the use or value of his property.128 
Furthermore, the “substantially advances” test, especially as applied without reference to the 
regulation’s effect on the owner’s property, invited courts to scrutinize the purpose, wisdom, 
and functionality of a regulatory act in an open-ended and potentially rigorous way.129 None 
 
121 Id. at 545-548.This discussion comprised almost the entirety of Part III of the Lingle decision. 
122 For more thorough descriptions of Lingle and its place within the Court’s regulatory takings doctrine, 
see D. Benjamin Barros, At Last, Some Clarity: The Potential Long-Term Impact of Lingle v. Chevron and the 
Separation of Takings and Substantive Due Process, 69 ALB. L. REV. 343 (2005); Fenster, supra note 22; Joseph 
William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles, Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 327-29 (2006). 
123 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 533. 
124 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1192 (D.Haw. 2002). 
125 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 363 F.3d 846, 852 (9th Cir. 2004). 
126 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539-541 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.. 458 U.S. 419, 426 
(1982) (holding that permanent physical invasion of property effects a taking), and Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (holding that a regulation that denies an owner “all economically 
beneficial uses” of her land effects a taking)). 
127 Id. (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-25 (1978) (establishing default 
standard for takings claims that makes “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries” into the challenged regulatory act 
and its effects). 
128 Id. at 540-542. 
129 Id. at 545-546 
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of the tests within the pantheon of regulatory takings jurisprudence makes such an inquiry—
and, the Court declared, none should.  Lingle banished the Agins test to the junkyard of 
abandoned constitutional doctrine. 
 
Lingle performed two additional tasks.  First, it clarified the nature of the regulatory 
takings inquiry.  The Takings Clause, the Court unanimously declared, protects property 
owners from the ends rather than the means of a regulation.  Put another way, the regulatory 
takings doctrine focuses only on effects and does not concern regulatory purpose and 
method.130 Second, in Lingle and in the other takings decisions from its 2004 Term, the Court 
clarified its general approach to the Takings Clause.131 The Takings Clause does not 
authorize the judiciary to second-guess or engage in searching review of decisions made by 
competent institutions whose authority to make those decisions has been long settled.  Instead, 
it empowers the judiciary to require compensation in instances in which another institution 
has clearly or functionally confiscated property.  The Court has provided hard-edged, 
powerful rules that apply a form of strict judicial scrutiny to address such instances.  But 
when those rules are not triggered, the judiciary as an institution must defer to expert agencies 
that are overseen by elected branches of government to whom regulatory decisions are 
delegated by federal constitution and state law. 
 
2. Exactions in Lingle 
Lingle concerned an economic regulation, rather than an exaction.  But in providing an 
authoritative restatement of its regulatory takings doctrine, the Court was forced to explain 
how Nollan and Dolan, as regulatory takings decisions, fit within its newly articulated, 
general approach to the Takings Clause.  It did so in two ways, in a separate and final Part III 
of the decision: by identifying the kinds of exactions to which the nexus and proportionality 
tests reach, and by offering a theoretical and doctrinal justification for those tests in the 
takings context.  The conditions that were challenged in Nollan and Dolan, the Court 
explained, were “adjudicative land-use exactions—specifically, government demands that a 
landowner dedicate an easement allowing public access to her property as a condition of 
obtaining a development permit.”132 These factual predicates concern the substance (or 
“what”) and procedural posture (or “how”) of the exactions to which the Court applied its 
nexus and proportionality tests.  The conditions in both cases required the property owner to 
dedicate land, or some entitlement relating to land (such as the right to exclude), rather than 
some other property, such as money.  As such, the exactions in Nollan and Dolan constituted 
“per se” takings that would clearly have required compensation but for the fact that they were 
part of a condition on development.133 The exactions also had been imposed individually, 
 
130 See Barros, supra note 122, at 348. 
131 See Singer, supra note 122, at 329. 
132 Id. at 546 (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379-380 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987)); see also Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546 (reiterating that in Dolan, the Court 
held that “an adjudicative exaction requiring dedication of private property” faced the application of a rough 
proportionality requirement). In a parenthetical explaining how Del Monte Dunes supported this limited reading 
of Nollan and Dolan’s applicability, the Court noted that Del Monte Dunes “emphasiz[ed] that we have not 
extended this standard "beyond the special context of [such] exactions.”  Id. (citing City of Monterey v. Del 
Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999)) (emphasis added). 
133 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547-548. 
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through an “adjudicative” process, rather than through the application of legislatively 
implemented, comprehensive sets of conditions required of all or many similarly situated 
property owners.134 
Lingle explained that the exactions rules protect property owners from being forced to 
suffer a deprivation of property as a development condition that would otherwise require 
compensation under the Takings Clause, and as such the decisions were based as much upon 
the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine as on the Takings Clause.135 But Nollan and Dolan 
did not strictly apply that doctrine;136 rather, they applied it as follows:  A transaction that 
appears to violate the Takings Clause may nevertheless be constitutionally permissible if the 
regulation is within the government’s police power authority and goes no further than is 
necessary to accomplish a legitimate police power objective.  An exaction can only escape 
takings liability if it relates both qualitatively (i.e., with an “essential nexus”) and 
quantitatively (i.e., in “rough proportionality”) to an important regulatory purpose—
mitigating the development’s expected negative consequences.137 Put another way, the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine does not bar any development condition that effects a per 
se taking without compensation, because a condition that is related, qualitatively and 
quantitatively, to a legitimate state purpose, is not an unconstitutional condition.   
 
Rather than enable the open-ended inquiry that the Agins test allowed, Lingle made 
plain that the nexus and proportionality tests anchor judicial review to a limited set of 
questions.138 These questions are both substantive and procedural.  The Takings Clause 
aspect of the exactions decisions protects an individual from a regulatory confiscation of real 
property that would otherwise constitute a per se taking.  Nollan and Dolan are thus consistent 
with Lingle because they consider the extent of the burden an individual property owner is 
being forced to bear.  The unconstitutional conditions doctrine aspect of the exactions 
decisions recognizes that a development condition is unconstitutional if the government 
unfairly takes advantage of its significant regulatory leverage by singling out a property 
owner in the administrative process and imposing a per se taking.  The act of singling out a 
property owner for an individualized regulation makes the condition more suspect; therefore, 
the application of heightened scrutiny only to such individualized acts, and only when the 
exaction would unquestionably be a taking if imposed directly, is consistent with Lingle’s 
 
134 See id. at 547 (characterizing both decisions as concerning “adjudicative land-use exactions,” and 
specifically describing Dolan’s “rough proportionality” rule as applying to an “adjudicative exaction”). 
135 Id. at 547-548 (quoting Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385).  
136 See DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 215-17 (2002) (concluding that 
constitutional property rights appear to receive limited, though not insignificant, protection in the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine). 
137 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547-548. 
138 The Court in Lingle did concede, however, that one could have read both Nollan and Dolan to be based 
in part on Agins, since the Court in both of its earlier decisions had cited the “substantially advances” test as 
bases for the nexus and proportionality tests.  See id. at 547; see also Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (citing Agins and its 
“substantially advances a legitimate state interest” test);Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 
834 (1987) (same).  See also Dwight H. Merriam & R. Jeffrey Lyman, Dealing with Dolan, Practically and 
Jurisprudentially, 1995 ZONING AND PLANNING HANDBOOK 111, 126-27 (arguing that the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine did not apply did not apply in Nollan because, unlike in Dolan, the Coastal Commission was 
not granting a discretionary benefit by allowing the Nollans to build their proposed house) 
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general disapproval of takings doctrines that allow rigorous judicial scrutiny of a regulation’s 
substantive wisdom.   Exacting a per se taking through an individualized process poses a 
greater risk of an unfair bargaining process that will result in an undue burden falling on a 
property owner.  When that risk is highest, the nexus and proportionality tests apply. 
 
The Court’s reasoning in Lingle appears decidedly post hoc.  Nollan did not declare 
itself to be based upon the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and cited no unconstitutional 
conditions precedent.139 Dolan’s discussion of the doctrine was thin,140 and included the 
absurd statement that the doctrine is “well-settled” when constitutional scholars agree only 
that it is as much of a mess as the regulatory takings doctrine.141 The signals Lingle sends 
regarding possessory exactions seem at least inconsistent with an earlier signal, sent soon 
after Dolan, when it vacated a California appellate court’s decision regarding the application 
of heightened scrutiny to fees.142 But such retroactive explanation is at the core of Lingle’s 
project to explain regulatory takings anyway; the decision’s power and authority arise from its 
ability to provide a coherent restatement to what was long considered an incoherent, 
unsatisfactory doctrine that expanded and contracted at the whims of a shifting Court 
majority.  If Lingle’s explanation of the exactions cases had arrived a bit late in the game and 
is not wholly persuasive, at least the Court unanimously and confidently offered an 
explanation that appears comprehensible, cohesive, and relatively consistent with its other 
regulatory takings decisions. 
 
3. Lingle, Exactions, and Precedent 
But should and will Lingle’s discussion of the exactions decisions, and specifically its 
description of Nollan and Dolan as limited to the factual circumstances of adjudicated 
conditions requiring the owners to dedicate land, have sufficient precedential value to resolve 
for lower courts the unsettled issues in the exactions decisions? The Court’s entire discussion 
of Nollan and Dolan in Lingle was, in a sense, beside the point of a case that concerned 
neither an exaction nor any of the legal rules established in the exactions decisions.  
Theoretically, Lingle could have been decided without any reference to exactions, and Justice 
O’Connor could have left Part III, the section on exactions, entirely out of her decision and 
 
139 Commentators have noted, however, that the doctrine was implicit in Nollan. See Been, supra note 26, 
at 474; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1463 (1989); Thomas W. 
Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public Goods, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 859, 868-69 
(1995) (characterizing as “mediocre” and “troubling” the majority decision’s effort to explain how and why it 
was extending the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to the Takings Clause). 
140 See Fenster, supra note 10, at 633 n.116. 
141 Compare Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385, with Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 1413, 1416 (1989) (describing judicial application of doctrine as “riven with inconsistencies”),  and Seth 
F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
1293, 1304 (1984) (complaining of inconsistent judicial application of the doctrine so marked “as to make a 
legal realist of almost any reader”).  Attempts to impose theoretical coherence to the doctrine have failed to settle 
the field in the least.  See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional 
Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 4-6 (2001) (summarizing earlier attempts to explain the 
unconstitutional doctrine, noting their failures, and offering still another such attempt). 
142 Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 512 U.S. 1231 (1994) (vacating and remanding, by a 5-4 vote, Ehrlich v. 
City of Culver City, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) in which the state court refused to apply exactions 
decisions to impact fee exactions in light of Dolan). 
24
still resolved the question before the Court.  Accordingly, a state or lower federal court 
considering a federal constitutional challenge to an exaction may attempt to ignore as dicta 
the Court’s statements limiting Nollan and Dolan—that is, as unnecessary to the decision and 
therefore as having no precedential value.143 Indeed, courts and commentators have used this 
reasoning before in order to ignore similar signals the Court had sent six years earlier in Del 
Monte Dunes.144 
Lingle’s discussion of Nollan and Dolan’s scope will not be so easy to ignore, 
however.  Unlike in Del Monte Dunes, the Court in Lingle discussed the facts, legal rules, and 
rationale of its exactions decisions thoroughly, and in the process offered its most 
comprehensive consideration of the issues in exactions since Dolan. More significantly, the 
Court explained that in order to settle the legal issue in Lingle, which required an integrated 
 
143 See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) (“[G]eneral 
expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If 
they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit, when 
the very point is presented for decision.”); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 749 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "holding" as 
"[a] court's determination of a matter of law pivotal to its decision; a principle drawn from such a decision"); id.
at 1102 (defining "obiter dictum" as "[a] judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that 
is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential"); EUGENE WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF 
CASES 15 (2d ed. 1894) (the rule of decision is “a proposition which strips away the unessential circumstances 
and declares a rule as to the essential ones”). 
144 See Isla Verde Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 990 P.2d 429, 437 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999), aff’d on 
different grounds, 49 P.3d 860 (Wash. 2002) (concluding that statements in Del Monte Dunes limiting Dolan to 
exactions requiring dedications of land were dicta, and for that reason ignoring them); Bruce W. Bringardner, 
Exactions, Impact Fees, and Dedications: National and Texas Law After Dolan and Del Monte Dunes, 32 URB.
LAW. 561, 582 (2000) (same). 
 Nor, unsurprisingly, was Lingle the first instance in which the Court has included what could be 
classified as dicta in its takings decisions.  Most recently, the Court’s decision in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation 
Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002), concerned only whether a temporary 
moratorium on development, which rendered property undevelopable, constituted a per se temporary taking for 
which compensation was due under Lucas, or instead represented merely a factor to be considered as part of a 
generalized inquiry under Penn Central into whether a taking occurred.  See id. at 306 (“The question presented 
is whether a moratorium on development imposed during the process of devising a comprehensive land-use plan 
constitutes a per se taking of property requiring compensation under the Takings Clause of the United States 
Constitution.”); id. at 337 (“In rejecting petitioners' per se rule, we do not hold that the temporary nature of a 
land-use restriction precludes finding that it effects a taking; we simply recognize that it should not be given 
exclusive significance one way or the other.”). Nevertheless, Justice Stevens’s six-justice majority decision 
stated unequivocally that the Court had adopted a “parcel as a whole rule” in which plaintiffs could not present 
their party in discrete segments in order to make a regulation seem more destructive of their property rights.  See 
id. at 331 (2002).  This conclusion was not entirely inapposite to the question before the Court, because the 
Tahoe-Sierra plaintiffs were attempting to sever their temporal property rights in discrete segments in order to 
claim that a moratorium affected the entire value of their property for the period of time in which it was in place.  
But the extension of the Court’s narrow holding to the severance of space was neither conceptually necessary nor 
required for the Court to reach its result—although, ironically, it did respond to earlier dicta from Justice Scalia’s 
decision in Lucas. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992) (suggesting 
that the denominator, or baseline of analysis, of  the property affected in a regulatory takings claim, should be 
based upon “how the owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped by the State's law of property,” although 
conceding that the issue was not before the Court).  For a critical view of Tahoe-Sierra’s dicta, see Steven J. 
Eagle, Planning Moratoria and Regulatory Takings: The Supreme Court’s Fairness Mandate Benefits 
Landowners, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 429, 441-47 (2004). 
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approach to the regulatory takings doctrine, it needed to explain its decisions in Nollan and 
Dolan.145 Insofar as Nollan and Dolan had appeared to depend (but, the Court instructed, did 
not in fact depend) in part upon the Agins test that the Court was discarding, and insofar as 
both parties had argued in their briefs about the precise relationship between the exactions 
decisions and Agins’s “substantially advances” test,146 the Court was required to explain how 
its decision would affect the viability of the nexus and proportionality tests.147 For the 
Court’s integrated theory of regulatory takings to cohere, it needed to provide a rationale for 
why Nollan and Dolan fit within this theory.  Part III accomplished that goal, at least to the 
Court’s satisfaction, and thus was central to the Court’s rationale.148 Lingle’s discussion of 
the exactions decisions is therefore best understood as a necessary step along the decisional 
path to its outcome and part of its holding, rather than as dicta.149 
If Part III of Lingle is part of the decision’s holding, then the Court has firmly 
established that the factual predicates of its exactions decisions—“adjudicative land-use 
exactions—specifically, government demands that a landowner dedicate an easement 
allowing public access to her property as a condition of obtaining a development permit”150—
are material to the applicability of the nexus and proportionality tests.151 And even if, under a 
constrained understanding of holding, Lingle’s discussion of the exactions decisions is seen 
merely as dicta, lower courts must view that discussion’s restatement of Nollan and Dolan as 
persuasive.  In Lingle the Court extensively explained the scope of those decisions, one aspect 
of which it had already declared six years earlier in Del Monte Dunes.152 It may have initially 
 
145 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547-548 (2005). 
146 Brief for Petitioners at 29, 33-35, 45-46, 48, Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (No. 
04-163); Brief for Respondent at 11-12, 18-19, 21-23, 33, 36, 40-41, Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 
528 (2005) (No. 04-163). 
147 As one commentator described the matter, taking away Agins as a foundation left Nollan and Dolan in a 
“precarious position.”  Sarah B. Nelson, Case Comment, Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
281, 290 (2006). 
148 See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2040-41 (1994) (arguing that a 
holding includes the rationale of a decision, as well as its facts and outcome). 
149 See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 1068 (2005) 
(characterizing a necessary step along the decisional path as a component of a decision’s holding, rather than 
dicta).  My argument is not intended to assert that the line between holding and dictum is self-obvious or 
discernible in the abstract. The problem of identifying that line is both formal and behavioralist. The tension 
between a narrow, particularistic reading of the judicial text and efforts to read decisions broadly in search of a 
generalizable, replicable rule that can be applied in future decisions may ultimately be unresolvable, part of an 
ongoing jurisprudential dialectic—related and analogous to the dialectic between rules and standards, for 
example, a quandary that also surfaces in regulatory takings doctrine.  See Charles W. Collier, Precedent and 
Legal Authority: A Critical History, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 771, 824-25; cf. Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 
UCLA L. REV. 379, 383 (1985).  And as the most recent, extremely exhaustive effort to “define dicta” itself 
admits, any effort to identify a clear holding/dicta line will face resistance from judges who strategically employ 
the concept to avoid precedents they dislike or reach results they prefer. See Abramowicz & Stearns, supra at 
1093.  That said, even if the line cannot be drawn in the abstract and the concepts are sufficiently indeterminate 
to allow bad-acting judges to willfully ignore precedent or reasonable arguments to be made on either side in 
difficult cases, there is sufficient content to the distinction to allow a line to be drawn in particular cases.  
150 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546-547 (emphasis added). 
151 For summaries of the literature on the precedential value of material facts, see Larry Alexander, 
Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 18 n.21 (1989); Dorf, supra note 148, at 2036 nn.142-43. 
152 See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
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been unclear that the exactions challenged in Nollan and Dolan were constitutionally suspect 
because of their substantive requirements and the procedure by which they were imposed.  
But the Court’s reiteration in Lingle that those facts have great constitutionally significance 
has now made these substantive and procedural qualities appear to be the necessary threshold 
for heightened scrutiny.  
 
IV. Exactions, Post-2005:  Regulatory Conditions in a Constitutional Shadow 
 
Lingle failed in two respects to settle the Court’s constitutionalization of exactions: it 
appeared to resolve live issues without a live controversy that raised those issues, and it did so 
without fully explaining its reasons.  Part III addressed the former failure; this Part attempts to 
compensate for the latter.  It begins by explaining why the limits the Court placed on Nollan 
and Dolan’s applicability in Lingle make practical sense.  The first three sections of this Part 
describe an institutional web of local authority and restraint—including decisions made by 
state and local institutions, as well as by private individuals—that offers a parallel set of 
constraints on local government discretion to the Court’s formalist rules, one that is more 
diverse and responsive to local regulatory needs.  The final section then explains how the 
existence and operation of this institutional web fits within Lingle’s broad restatement of the 
regulatory takings doctrine.   
 
A. State Legislatures and State Courts 
 
The Takings Clause, as enforced by federal and state courts, is not the sole restraint on 
local regulatory authority.  In the first instance, state legislatures and courts can simply deny 
local governments the authority to impose exactions at all.153 The great increase in exactions 
was first authorized during the 1970s and 1980s by state courts, which found implied 
municipal authority to impose exactions.154 Soon thereafter, many legislatures, especially in 
 
153 See generally MANDELKER, supra note 96 at §§ 9.18, 9.21 (noting that fewer than half the states have 
adopted legislation authorizing impact fees and discussing state court decisions ruling on local authority to 
impose exactions and impact fees in the absence of clear statutory authority).  Iowa, for example, has provided 
neither statutory nor common law authority to impose impact fees. See Home Builders Ass'n of Greater Des 
Moines v. City of West Des Moines, 644 N.W.2d 339, 349-50 (Iowa 2002) (holding that impact fees are a tax 
that municipalities are not authorized to levy); Madelaine Jerousek, Who pays for growth: Developers of cities?,
DES MOINES REGISTER, July 8, 2002, available at 
http://desmoinesregister.com/news/stories/c4780934/18643482.html. By contrast, the California Supreme Court 
long ago found them authorized under state law.  See Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 207 P.2d 1 (Cal. 
1949). 
154 See, e.g., Contractors & Builder’s Assoc. of Pinellas County vs. City of Dunedin, 326 So.2d 314 (Fla. 
1976) (striking down a system development fee, but providing guidelines for an acceptable impact fee system); 
see generally New Jersey Builders Ass'n v. Mayor and Tp. Committee of Bernards Tp., Somerset County, 528 
A.2d 555, 557-60 (N.J. 1987) (summarizing the development of exactions as a regulatory tool and state court 
responses to the issue of local authority to impose them); Frona M. Powell, Challenging Authority for Municipal 
Subdivision Exactions: The Ultra Vires Attack, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 635, 645-70 (1990) (summarizing state court 
decisions on inherent local authority to impose exactions).  Histories of how particular states authorized 
exactions demonstrate the mix of constitutional, statutory, and common law authorities through which state 
courts resolved challenges to municipal power to impose exactions.  See Norman Marcus, Development 
Exactions: The Emerging Law in New York State, in PRIVATE SUPPLY OF PUBLIC SERVICES, supra note 48, at 66. 
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fast-growing regions of the country, granted municipalities explicit authority to impose 
impact fees, with the result that their use expanded rapidly in the late 1980s and early 
1990s.155 In a number of instances, the development and real estate industries in individual 
states played significant roles in the drafting and passage of those states’ impact fee 
statutes.156 And much of the legislation focused on impact fees and fees in lieu of dedication 
due to their administrative advantages over dedications of land.  Because parcels of land are 
relatively unique (and treated as such under the common law), impact fees appear more 
precisely quantitative and scientific, and the money they raise can be used more flexibly than 
an immobile piece of land.157 
State legislation has thereby become the most significant mechanism for controlling 
local discretion to impose exactions.  The resulting statutes vary widely, reflecting a 
sensitivity to statewide needs, local regulatory practice, the relationship between a particular 
state and its municipal authorities, and state and local politics.158 They significantly overlap 
in their generalities but diverge in their particulars.  Although they typically limit local 
authority to impose impact fees or exactions generally to particular types of exactions, for 
example, they vary as to the types of exactions they will allow.159 Some states authorize their 
 
155 See DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES IN THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN REGION, supra note 47, at 57, 57 (J. Bart 
Johnson & James van Hemert ed., 2d ed. 2005); Been, supra note 31, at 141; Martin L. Leitner & Susan P. 
Schoettle, A Survey of State Impact Fee Enabling Legislation, 25 Urb. Law. 491, 491-92 & n.6 (1993).  For an 
informative history of the evolution of exactions requiring conservation easements from an ad hoc, 
individualized process to one governed by state statutes, see Jessica Owley Lippmann, The Emergence of 
Exacted Conservation Easements, 84 NEB. L. REV. 1043, 1096-1102 (2006). 
156 See, e.g., Anita P. Miller, New Mexico Development Impact Fees, in DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES IN 
THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN REGION, supra note 47, at 57, 57; James van Hemert, Nevada Development Impact Fees,
in id. at 51, 51. 
157 See Fenster, supra note 10, at 645-48.  Empirical studies of exactions practices have not identified 
precisely how fees are typically set and what percentage are set legislatively rather than individually, but 
research seems to indicate that at least with respect to impact fees, the majority are constituted legislatively, 
frequently through formulas based on the anticipated marginal costs of each new unit.  See Been, supra note 31, 
at 144. 
158 Arizona, for example, grants a general authority for assessing development fees to cities, but 
specifically enumerates a limited number of facilities for which fees can be assessed.  Compare Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
§ 9-463.05(A) (cities) with Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-1102(A) (counties); but see Home Builders Ass’n of Central 
Ariz. v. City of Apache Junction, 11 P.3d 1032, 1040 (Ariz. App. Div. 2000) (suggesting that different 
legislative provisions did not create an inference that cities could use open-ended authority to use impact fees to 
fund school construction costs). 
159 California’s exactions statutes are exceptionally broad.  See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 66000 et seq. 
(Mitigation Fee Act, authorizing local agencies to require payment of fees to defray all or a portion of the cost of 
public facilities related to a development project); §§ 66410 et seq. (Subdivision Map Act, authorizing local 
agencies to require improvements on land as condition on subdivision map approval); § 66475 (authorizing local 
agency to require “dedication or irrevocable offer of dedication of real property within the subdivision for 
streets, alleys, including access rights and abutter's rights, drainage, public utility easements and other public 
easements”).  New Hampshire’s statute is less broad than California’s set of statutory authorities, but is 
nevertheless extensive. N.H. Rev. Stat. § 674:21(V) (enumerating an exclusive but extensive list of facilities for 
which impact fees can be collected).  Texas has a quite complicated and elaborate statute. Tex. Local Gov’t Code 
§ 395.001(5) (defining “impact fees” to include “a charge or assessment imposed by a political subdivision 
against new development in order to generate revenue for funding or recouping the costs of capital 
improvements or facility expansions necessitated by and attributable to the new development” and dedications of 
land, as well as certain types of fees for constructing and extending water mains or lines).  Illinois, by contrast, 
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local governments by statute to require land dedications for certain purposes,160 while 
Massachusetts specifically forbids municipalities from requiring the dedication of land for a 
public way, park, or playground as a condition for subdivision approval without the payment 
of compensation.161 Some even delegate authority to special districts to impose impact fees 
on new development for the district’s particular purpose.162 
State statutes typically impose procedural requirements on local promulgation of 
exactions ordinances, although they vary in how they do so.  A number of states, especially in 
the intermountain west, require the participation of private citizens in the process by which 
impact fee ordinances are passed, and include explicit requirements that developers have a 
significant voice in that process.163 Some statutes impose upon local governments the duty to 
plan comprehensively for the financing of their capital infrastructural improvements,164 and 
thus passage of the comprehensive plan and its ongoing revision and amendment over time 
can check future local discretion.165 Colorado has a general, explicit requirement that all 
exactions must be imposed pursuant to a duly adopted law, regulation, or policy, or to some 
adequate standard applied on a rational and consistent basis.166 And most impact fee statutes 
stipulate elements or methodologies that a local government must include in their fee 
schedules,167 as well as specify the means for collecting funds and accounting for their use.168 
only authorizes exactions for road improvements, see 605 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/5-901 et seq., and for school 
grounds, see 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/11-12-5(7); Thompson v. Village of Newark, 768 N.E.2d 856 (Ill. App. 
2002) (construing use of the phrase “school grounds” in impact fee statute narrowly to exclude impact fees for 
school buildings). 
160 See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 462.358(2b); N.Y. Town Law § 277(4). 
161 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 41 § 81 Q.  This predisposition in Massachusetts against exactions extends to 
the judicial review of impact fees as well.  See Lawrence Friedman & Eric W. Wodlinger, Municipal Impact 
Fees in Massachusetts, 88 MASS. L. REV. 131 (2004).  
162 In the Boise area, for example, the Ada County Highway District, under Idaho state authority, began in 
1992 to collect impact fees for public roads.  See CONNIE B. COOPER, TRANSPORTATION IMPACT FEES AND 
EXCISE TAXES 21-23 (2000); ADA COUNTY, ID., HIGHWAY DISTRICT IMPACT FEE ORDINANCE NO. 200, § 7306, 
7312, Tables A & B (Nov. 5, 2004), available at http://www.achd.ada.id.us/Departments/rowpd/impacfee.asp. 
163 See ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 27, at 53-54.  See, e.g., Idaho Code §§ 67-8205(2) 
(requiring that every governmental entity that adopts an impact fee program appoint an advisory committee of at 
least five members, two of whom must be active in the land development, construction, or real estate industry); 
Nev. Rev. Stat. §§  278B.150, 278B.150(2)(a), (b) (requiring every government body imposing an impact fee to 
have a “capital improvements advisory committee” of at least five members, at least one of whom must represent 
the real estate, development, or building industry). 
164 See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 5-8-2(P); Tex. Local Gov’t Code § 395.014; Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) § 
82.02.050. 
165 Daniel R. Mandelker, Planning and the Law, 20 VT. L. REV. 657, 658-60 (1996). 
166 Colo. Rev. Stat. 29-29-204(2)(e). 
167 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. 29-20-104.5(2) (requiring local government to “quantify the reasonable 
impact” of the development on capital facilities, and prohibiting fees that would remedy existing deficiencies); 
S.C. Code Ann. § 6-1-980 (stipulating means to calculate maximum allowable amount of impact fee, and 
requiring the use of “generally accepted accounting principles” in calculation). 
168 See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code § 66006 (requiring earmarking of impact fee receipts and placement of funds 
in separate interest-bearing accounts); Colo. Rev. Stat. 29-1-801 – 29-1-804 (similar earmarking requirement as 
California); W.Va. Code § 7-20-8(d) (same); Douglas County Contractors Ass'n v. Douglas County, 929 P.2d 
253, 256-58 (Nev. 1996) (striking down county’s school impact fee ordinance for failing to follow state 
legislation that required earmarking of collected funds). 
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State legislatures typically include provisions establishing substantive standards in 
their statutes in order to make certain that impact fees are fairly applied and promote, or at 
least do not hinder, other important public policy goals.  At minimum, impact fee statutes 
impose a “reasonable relationship” test on fees that are imposed.169 Colorado and Utah have 
codified the nexus and proportionality tests from Nollan and Dolan for individualized and 
discretionary exactions, and have extended those tests to fees as well as to required 
dedications of land.170  This is in contrast to Washington state, whose supreme court has held 
that its state’s impact fee statute specifically does not incorporate the Nollan and Dolan tests 
(which, the Court reasoned in dicta, do not apply to fees and may not apply to legislatively 
imposed exactions), and requires only that impact fees that are “reasonably related and 
beneficial to the particular development seeking approval,” while it authorizes fees that would 
fund area-wide infrastructure.171 Accordingly, municipalities in Washington need only 
require that the A number of statutes also protect against excessive exactions by explicitly 
prohibiting their use either to remedy current inadequacies in capital infrastructure or to 
upgrade the jurisdiction’s current level of service in its existing service provision and 
infrastructure.172 And at least one statute specifically provides for local governments to 
reduce or waive a legislative impact fee for affordable housing and for economic development 
that is expected to increase sales tax revenues.173 
At the same time, state courts do more than simply enforce Nollan and Dolan. The 
issue of local authority to impose development conditions, which was more significant during 
the first (pre- Nollan) generation of exactions,174 remains important for those states whose 
legislatures have not granted express authority to local governments.175 And state courts 
enforce the requirements imposed by state legislatures on local governments authorized to 
impose exactions.176 
169 See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code § 66001(3),(4) (requiring local agency seeking to impose an impact fee to 
find “a reasonable relationship” between the fee’s use and the type of development project on which the fee is 
imposed” and between the need for the public facility and the type of development project on which the fee is 
imposed). 
170 See Colo. Rev. Stat. 29-20-203(1). Utah Code Ann. 17-27a-507; B.A.M. Development, L.L.C. v. Salt 
Lake County, 128 P.3d 1161, 1168 (Utah 2006).  Colorado’s legislative scheme extending Nollan and Dolan to 
fees as well as land, but limiting their applicability to individualized exactions, codified the Colorado Supreme 
Court’s decision in Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P3d 687 (Colo. 2001). 
171 City of Olympia v. Drebick, 126 P.3d 802, 808, 811 (Wash. 2006) (interpreting R.C.W. 82.02.050-
.090). 
172 See Ga. Code Ann. § 36-71-8; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 278B.280. 
173 See N.M. Stat. §§ 5-8-3(D), 5-8-13. 
174 See supra Part I.A. 
175 See 4 ANDERSON'S AM. LAW. ZONING § 25:24 (4th ed. 2006) 
176 See, e.g., Cherokee County v. Greater Atlanta Homebuilders Ass’n, 566 S.E.2d 470, 475-76 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2002) (upholding an impact fee against challenge under a state statute limiting exactions to a 
“proportionate share” of the cost of infrastructural system improvements); Simonsen v. Town of Derby, 765 
A.2d 1033, 1036 (N.H. 2000) (invalidating an impact fee imposed by a municipal planning board because the 
town had failed to pass an impact fee ordinance required by state statute). 
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State courts also apply state constitutional law, interpret the extent of general local 
authority, and enforce state legislative statutes that authorize but limit specific local authority 
to impose exactions.  As with legislatures that have established similar but nevertheless 
distinct exactions statutes, state courts have taken distinct approaches to the standards they 
create for reviewing exactions under state law.177 Some courts, such as Utah’s Supreme 
Court, have come up with complicated, multi-factor tests to review the extent of the burden 
created by an exaction.178 Florida’s Supreme Court, by contrast, has come up with a far 
simpler “dual rational nexus test” that has proven more influential for courts and 
commentators.179 The Illinois Supreme Court continues to apply its “specifically and 
uniquely attributable” test for exactions, which was recognized by the Court in Dolan as one 
of the strictest of the pre-Nollan state court standards.180 
To illustrate the relationship between state and local government and among the 
several state governments, consider a recent intermediate appellate decision from 
Massachusetts, Greater Franklin Developers Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Franklin.181 Franklin is a 
fast-growing town outside of Boston that, in the mid-1990s, suffered from a shortage of 
schools.  On the advice of consultants, the town adopted an impact fee ordinance that would 
“ensure[] that development bears a proportionate share of the cost of capital facilities 
necessary to accommodate such development and to promote and protect the public health, 
safety and welfare.”182 The town’s ordinance included a schedule of fees placed on different 
types of housing and based upon the anticipated number of children in each type, and required 
that the funds be placed in a separate fund with unused portions returned to the developer 
after eight years.183 Applying a Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision from 1983 
that applied a very narrow definition of a user “fee” that a Massachusetts municipality could 
legally charge, the court in Greater Franklin Developers declared the ordinance invalid as an 
 
177 See generally Nick Rosenberg, Comment, Development Impact Fees: Is Limited Cost Internalization 
Actually Smart Growth?, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 641, 651-72 (2003) (surveying different state court 
approaches). 
178 See, e.g., Banberry Dev’t Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899, 903 (Utah 1981) (listing seven 
factors that consider in more precise ways the burden that new development will create on existing infrastructure 
and the existing manner the municipality uses to finance existing capital facilities).  California tops Utah—its 
Supreme Court has offered thirteen factors for consideration. See Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 
941 P.2d 851, 860-61 (Cal. 1997) (listing and explaining factors); Massingill v. Dep't of Food & Agric., 125 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 561, 566- 67 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (applying factors). 
179 See Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 609-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)) 
(developing a due process-based dual rational nexus test that considers whether there was a reasonable 
connection between first, the locality's need for additional capital facilities and the new development and second, 
the funds collected and the benefits accruing to the new development); Home Builders Ass’n v. City of 
Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349 (Ohio 2000) (adopting dual rational nexus test); see also Julian C. Juergensmeyer 
& James C. Nicholas, Impact Fees Should Not Be Subjected to Takings Analysis, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS 
ISSUES 357, 359-63 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002) (arguing in favor of dual rational nexus test and its 
conceptual and practical superiority to Nollan and Dolan). 
180 See Northern Ill. Home Builders v. County of Du Page, 649 NE2d 384, 389-90 (Ill. 1995) (applying test 
from Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Mt. Prospect, 176 NE2d 799 (Ill. 1961), to review impact fee enabling 
statute); Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389-90 (discussing Pioneer Trust test). 
181 730 N.E.2d 900 (Mass. App. Ct., 2000). 
182 Id. at 901 (quoting Franklin By-Law § 83-2(2)). 
183 Id.
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impermissible tax because the benefits of the impact fees would redound to the entire 
community and not just to the projected new residents.184 As a general matter, the court 
reasoned, everyone profits from an educated population; and, furthermore, the facilities built 
from the proceeds of the impact fees intended for the use of future residents would at least be 
accessible to, and may even be enjoyed by current residents who had contributed nothing to 
the facilities’ expense.185 
Relying on precedent and older decisions from other jurisdictions, the court staked out 
Massachusetts law as a harsh outlier, one that rejected more lenient, though still difficult 
standards like Florida’s dual rational nexus test.186 Lacking support in existing state common 
law and refused review by the Supreme Judicial Council,187 the town was left to petition the 
state legislature for the authority to pass an ordinance imposing impact fees.  To date, the 
Massachusetts legislature has not obliged.188 Whether correct or foolish as a matter of policy, 
the state has refused to grant its municipalities broad authority to use exactions, thereby 
illustrating that states can and do serve as avid protectors of the interests of property owners 
and developers, even in the face of a general judicial and legislative shift towards expanding a 
general, if still limited, authority to impose exactions. 
 
B. Local Governments, Local Ordinances 
 
Local governments check their own discretion as well by committing to substantive 
and procedural standards through local ordinances.  These commitments are especially 
important because even before Lingle, exactions that are imposed by legislation or that 
impose monetary exactions may avoid the constitutional nexus and proportionality rules 
depending on how the relevant state courts have interpreted Nollan and Dolan.189 Whether 
passed because of a state legislative mandate or a decision to commit legislatively to 
particular regulatory practices, these ordinances represent an important self-imposed check on 
local regulatory discretion. 
 
Due in part to differences among state exactions statutes, as well as to their unique 
regulatory needs, politics, and commitment to regulation, such ordinances vary widely.190 
Consider the exactions ordinances of several fast-growing mid-sized cities, chosen because of 
 
184 Emerson College v. Boston, 462 N.E.2d 1098 (1984). 
185 Id. at 902.  Thus, the school impact fee differed from the electrical service connection fee upheld in 
Bertone v. Department of Public Utilities, 583 N.E.2d 829 (Mass. 1992), which was exclusively for the benefit 
of the new development. 
186 Id. at 903 (citing Daniels v. Point Pleasant, 129 A.2d 265 (1957), and Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Mt. 
Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961), for support, and distinguishing St. Johns County v. Northeast Florida Builders 
Assn., Inc., 583 So.2d 635 (Fla.1991)). 
187 738 N.E.2d 750 (Mass. 2000).  See also Friedman & Wodlinger, supra note 161, at 137 (arguing that 
Massachusetts courts should adopt Florida’s dual rational nexus test). 
188 See Patric O'Brien, Comment, The Bizarre Journey of Impact Fees in Massachusetts: From the 
“Foothills of Confusion” Around the “Mountains of Ignorance” and Up Into the “Castle in the Air”—Will 
“Rhyme” and “Reason” Ever Be Rescued?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 511, 541-43 (2001). 
189 See supra text accompanying notes 81-88. 
190 On the reasons for why local jurisdictions are likely to vary in their desire and ability to impose 
exactions, see Been, supra note 31, at 151-52. 
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their placement at the top of recent reports tracking patterns of domestic migration.191 These 
ordinances, and the regulatory practices they limit and direct, show similar patterns and 
important divergences.  Fayetteville, Arkansas and Austin, Texas, for example, have 
promulgated a somewhat similar, limited set of enumerated exactions ordinances despite 
significant distinctions between their state impact fee statutes.192 Arizona’s impact fee statute 
provides more authority to local governments to set impact fees,193 and the city of Mesa’s 
impact fee ordinance collects a far broader range of fees, ranging from water and wastewater 
to public safety and fire, and including parks, cultural facilities, and libraries.194 And despite 
Illinois’ heightened judicial scrutiny of exactions,195 the city of Aurora includes a significant 
range of exactions in its code, including the dedication of land for schools and parks, and a 
 
191 The small sample that follows is based on cities that appeared at the top of the 2004 and 2005 U-Haul 
National Migration Trend Report, which tracks growth areas for families that transacted with U-Haul during a 
calendar year.  See http://secure.uhaul.com/pr/Redirect.aspx?FileName=U-HaulGrowthCities04.pdf,
http://secure.uhaul.com/pr/Redirect.aspx?FileName=U-HaulGrowthCities05.pdf.  This does not purport either to 
represent a scientific sample of cities, nor—because it includes neither counties nor special districts—of the 
range of municipal exactions ordinance.  Instead, this is merely intended to serve as a snapshot of several fast-
growing cities located in different states and regions in order to demonstrate the variance among cities that adopt 
exactions ordinances.  
In U-Haul’s 2004 survey of cities with more than 10,000 families moving, Fayetteville, Arkansas 
finished first, Austin, Texas finished third, and Mesa, Arizona finished fourth; in the 2005 survey, Austin 
finished first and Aurora, Illinois finished second.  In U-Haul’s 2004 and 2005 survey of cities with between 
5000 and 10,000 families moving in, Boise, Idaho finished first both years and Victorville finished second in 
2005 and fourth in 2004.  Des Moines, Iowa, which finished third in the 5000-10,000 category in 2005 and 
second in 2004, is prohibited by the state constitution from imposing impact fees, and to date has not received 
authorization from the state legislature.  See supra note 153. 
192 Fayetteville’s city code imposes impact fees for water and wastewater impacts, police and public safety 
system impacts, and fire safety system impacts, many of which were recently adopted only recently after the 
state legislature granted municipalities explicit authority to impose impact fees. FAYETTEVILLE, ARK., CITY OF 
FAYETTEVILLE UNIFIED DEVELOPMENT CODE § 159.02, 159.03, 159.04. All but the water-related impact fees 
appear to have been adopted in 2005.  The state passed an impact fee statute in 2003, Ark. Code Ann. § 14-56-
103 (2005) (2003 Arkansas Laws Act 1719 (S.B. 620)), although its state supreme court has found police power 
authority for fees that are fair and reasonable and that bear a reasonable relationship to the benefit to recipients of 
the improved service.  See City of Marion v. Baioni, 850 S.W.2d 1 (1993). More than two decades ago, the 
Arkansas Supreme Court had stuck down an early impact fee that Fayetteville had imposed for parks and park 
facilities on the grounds that the city had not planned sufficiently to justify the developer’s contribution and had 
failed to provide for a refund in the event that the parks were not developed.  See City of Fayetteville v. IBI, 
Inc.,659 S.W.2d 505 (Ark. 1983). 
Austin’s city code imposes on subdivisions water and wastewater impact fees, Austin City Code § 25-9-
324, and parkland dedication requirements. AUSTIN, TEX., AUSTIN CITY CODE § 30-2-214.  The Texas impact fee 
statute is significantly older than Arkansas’s and much more complicated. Tex. Local Gov’t Code §§ 395.001-
395.080; see also MANDELKER, supra note 96, at § 9.21 (characterizing Texas statute as “[o]ne of the most 
elaborate impact fee statutes”). 
193 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 9.563.05 et seq.; see also Douglas A. Jorden & Randal W. Studer, Arizona 
Development Impact Fees, in DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES IN THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN REGION, supra note 47, at 
1-4 (describing history of Arizona statute authorizing cities to levy impact fees and characterizing the use of fees 
in the state as “common”). 
194 MESA, ARIZ., MESA CITY CODE § 5-17-5(A). 
195 See supra text accompanying note 180. 
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variety of fees.196 And a number of these cities offer exemptions from impact fees for certain 
types of development, including affordable housing.197 
Local governments frequently adopt substantive standards in their ordinances that 
reflect an understanding of the Supreme Court’s quantitative and qualitative exactions tests.   
The proportionality issue is clearest in impact fee ordinances, which typically operate 
formulaically through a schedule of fees or some generally applicable calculation whose 
methodology is specified in the ordinance itself.198 They thereby attempt to meet state 
legislative requirements and frequently adopt the constitutional requirements for the 
proportionality test under Dolan (or a relatively equivalent standard), while offering a gloss of 
mathematical precision and fairness.  Because of the development in disciplines such as 
traffic engineering, some types of anticipated impacts lend themselves more clearly to 
formulas and as such are more widely adopted subject matter for impact fees.199 Localities 
also legislate qualitative standards that parallel Nollan’s nexus test (without always adopting 
its rigor), frequently by incorporating a relevant state standard that requires a relationship 
between the exaction and the impact that the development is expected to cause.200 
Although similar, these ordinances demonstrate no clear substantive pattern.  Local 
governments do not necessarily seize the full extent of their potential municipal authority 
under state law in their ordinances; rather than using their authority to maximize leverage, 
municipal legislative practices reflect the exigent and contingent political realities the local 
legislature faced at the time of the ordinances’ passage.  And although they bind themselves 
by ordinance, their actual practices may vary widely—perhaps by requiring additional 
exactions beyond those stated in local legislation, and perhaps too by exacting money or land 
at other points in the development process.201 
C. Jurisdictional Competition, Private Decisions 
196 AURORA, ILL., AURORA CITY CODE § 43-56 (requiring dedication of land or payment of a fee in lieu of 
dedication for schools “to serve the immediate and future needs of the residents of the development as a 
condition of subdivision approval”); AURORA, ILL., AURORA CITY CODE § 23-11(1) (requiring parkland 
dedication); AURORA, ILL., AURORA CITY CODE §§ 23-16, 17, 18 (impact fees for public works, the fire 
department, and school development). 
197 AUSTIN, TEX., AUSTIN CITY CODE § 25-9-347; BOISE, IDA., BOISE CITY CODE § 4-12-08(B); 
FAYETTEVILLE, ARK., CITY OF FAYETTEVILLE UNIFIED DEVELOPMENT CODE § 159.02(D)(4), 159.03(D)(4), 
159.04(D)(4). 
198 See, e.g., MESA, ARIZ., MESA CITY CODE § 5-17, Tables 1-7 (detailing a schedule of impact fees); 
BOISE, IDA., BOISE CITY CODE § 4-12-13(F), (G), (H) (providing methodology for park impact fee schedule, and 
allowing for individual assessment where the fee payer can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that 
the established impact fee is inappropriate”). 
199 See COOPER, supra note 162, at 10-12 (summarizing study of sixteen jurisdictions’ transportation 
impact fees and taxes, and identifying the formulaic basis of the methodologies most use, including a manual 
produced by the Institute of Transportation Engineers).  Traffic is also typically a matter of great public concern. 
200 See, e.g., AURORA, ILL., AURORA CITY CODE § 23-18(a) (school development fees must cover only 
“proportionate share of costs); BOISE, IDA., BOISE CITY CODE §§ 4-12-05, 4-12-06 (requiring that exactions 
impose “proportionate share” of costs); VICTORVILLE, CAL., VICTORVILLE MUNICIPAL CODE § 15.04.060(b) 
(requiring that the city council demonstrate a “reasonable relationship” between impact fees and new 
development). 
201 See supra note 96. 
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As numerous commentators have argued, the competitive market between 
jurisdictions for attracting residents, businesses, and industry disciplines local governments 
that might otherwise exploit property owners through excessive exactions.202 The market 
mechanism works like this.  Across the country, within a region, and even in a metropolitan 
area, local governments compete with each other for residents by offering a package of taxes, 
services, and amenities; individuals, businesses, and industry respond as market participants 
by moving into and away from jurisdictions based on their preferences.203 Although property 
is a fixed resource and cannot be moved between jurisdictions (except insofar as the 
jurisdictional borders are unstable), new entrants arrive and purchase property and existing 
residents depart and sell property based in part on their response to actions taken and signals 
sent by local governments.  Such actions and signals include the regulation of land use.  Local 
governments with high proportions of valuable residential housing tend to perform a “race to 
the top” of environmental control and planning.  They do so because such regulation is 
politically popular among homeowners seeking to protect the values in their property by 
limiting the risk of local and neighborhood change.204 
Accordingly, municipal decisions to exact property and money in the development of 
land, with their attendant effects on the value of existing and proposed new development, take 
place within a market-like system.  Regulatory decisions about whether and to what extent a 
jurisdiction imposes exactions on new development in turn affect property values throughout 
the community, levels of participation in local politics and the results of local elections, and, 
ultimately, entry into and exit from the community.205 The threat of homeowner disaffection 
is at once public—insofar as it can result in political changes to the composition of the elected 
bodies that preside over land use regulation—and private—insofar as individual decisions to 
exit affect the composition of communities and the values of property within them.206 
The discipline that competing jurisdictions provide is not perfect.  Local governments 
can exploit their monopoly of police power authority within their jurisdiction, while 
individual homeowners have immobile assets and one group that could be harmed by 
excessive exactions, potential homebuyers, are frequently not citizens of the community that 
imposes exactions.207 Interjurisdictional competition can also create significant distributive 
problems, insofar as the consumers of local public goods have vastly different financial 
resources and abilities to exit, and people’s preferences for living near and pooling resources 
with those of similar demographics and resources can impact the quality of a jurisdiction’s 
 
202 See FISCHEL, supra note 33, at 39-97; Been, supra note 26; Fennell, supra note 14, at 53-54, 56-58; 
203 See FISCHEL, supra note 33, at 58-63; Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. 
POL. ECON. 416 (1956). 
204 FISCHEL, supra note 33, at 3-10. 
205 See Rose, supra note 32, at 882-87 (adapting ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 
(1970) to the political economy of local land use regulation). 
206 Indeed, because of the relationships between political voice and exit, and between the putatively private 
concerns of community composition and property values and the putatively public concerns of electoral political 
and   the threat demonstrates the meaninglessness of the public/private distinction itself 
207 See Sterk, supra note 42. 
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public goods.208 And the Tiebout model itself fails to capture both the complex and dynamic 
internal operations of local governments and the extent of their authority—issues that affect 
both the exactions that a municipality can impose and the bureaucratic practices and politics 
that it actually does impose.209 But the dynamics produced by market-like public and private 
behavior provide a further brake on local discretion to impose exactions. 
 
D. Lingle, Exactions, and the Court’s Institutionalist Focus 
 
This complex mix of institutional oversight, which includes but is not defined by the 
constraints imposed by the Takings Clause, explains why Lingle commands a narrow 
application of Nollan and Dolan. Lingle recognized the problems caused when the judiciary 
relies upon the limited authority provided by the Takings Clause to engage in heightened 
scrutiny of substantive, discretionary regulatory decisions.  Lingle’s institutionalist focus sets 
forth a mixture of hard rules and deferential standards that invite searching judicial review in 
factual circumstances when competent institutions appear to have overstepped their 
constitutional authority by confiscating property.  When those facts are not in evidence, the 
constitution requires a far less rigorous balancing of indeterminate factors.  In those latter 
instances, local administrative agencies are sufficiently competent, and sufficiently overseen 
by external political institutions, to deserve deference.  Lingle extended this approach to its 
exactions decisions by narrowing the application of the Takings Clause only to exactions that 
strongly suggest the government has overstepped its authority.  In the absence of facts 
creating that inference, other institutions can more competently provide the less strenuous 
oversight required to check local discretion.  
 
In Lingle, the Court failed to specify why these other institutions are especially 
competent and worthy of deference in the specific context of exactions.  But elsewhere in 
Lingle and in the other takings decisions from the 2004 Term the Court explained why local 
institutions applying state and local are more competent than courts applying the Takings 
Clause.210 In those decisions, all of which concerned property owner challenges to local 
regulatory programs, the Court invoked the need for courts to defer to a “carefully 
formulated” effort to comprehensively plan,211 warned against substituting a judicial judgment 
for one reached through politically accountable institutions,212 and preached respect and 
“comity” to state courts.213 It suggested that property owners frustrated by the actions of their 
local government could seek political solutions through their state government.214 And the 
Court sought explicitly to match the proper legal form to the degree of deference that lower 
courts should give the decisions of political and administrative agencies: strong takings rules 
are intended to focus heightened scrutiny on a narrowly-defined set of actions likely to lead to 
 
208 See Lee Anne Fennell, Homes Rule, 112 YALE L.J. 617, 663 (2002) (reviewing FISCHEL, supra note 
33). 
209 Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 400-01 
(1990). 
210 The discussion that follows summarizes Fenster, supra note 22. 
211 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005). 
212 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 541-44. 
213 San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 125 S.Ct. 2491, 2505 (2005). 
214 Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2668. 
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government rent-seeking and exploitation; while deferential standards allow no more than a 
relatively cursory review of actions where the agencies are likely to have more expertise than 
courts.215 
In light of these general arguments, the justification for the Court’s implicit 
assumption about the desirability of other forms of institutional oversight in the exactions 
context would be as follows.  As this Article has explained, local governments have been 
imposing exactions since before the Court intervened in Nollan and have continued to do so 
both under Nollan and Dolan’s commands and in their shadow for more than a decade now.  
And they have been doing so with oversight from a web of local and state institutions which 
provides property rights protections that are less uniform but more sensitive to local 
circumstance and political culture. This web’s diverse elements enables greater interplay 
among levels of government and public and private actors, more creativity and expertise in 
devising and responding to regulatory strategies, and more checks and balances between state 
actors and the forces that constrain state action.  The resulting regulatory practices have varied 
in effects and effectiveness, but they nevertheless engender creativity in developing and 
checking the use of exactions where locally appropriate regulatory oversight is most available 
and valuable: in state and local legislatures and in state courts applying state law. 
 
This institutional web allows both a strong measure of local discretion on the 
regulatory ground, as well as a complex set of institutional constraints that operate ex ante and 
ex post.  It thus affirms, in the first instance, the localist emphasis in land use control.216 As 
political theorists from a broad array of traditions and normative perspectives have argued, 
local government located within a decentralized system of governance offers numerous 
advantages and boasts numerous virtues: a liberal, Tocquevillean localism views 
decentralization as an instrumental means to educate and develop self-governance;217 a 
Brandeisian localism (derived from his characterization of states in a federalist system) views 
decentralization as a source of innovation and experimentation;218 a Tieboutian localism 
views decentralization as a means to maximize effective market competition in jurisdictions 
and to enable individual choice;219 and a civic republican, communitarian, or radical vision of 
decentralized localism views a small-sized, accessible, and responsive state as the government 
form most likely to enable a participatory democracy and lively public sphere.220 Limiting 
 
215 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537-39, 545-47. 
216 See Marc R. Poirier, Federalism and Localism in Kelo and San Remo (July 23, 2006) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
217 See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 61 (Henry Reeve trans., 1987); Roderick M. 
Hills, Jr., Is Federalism Good for Localism? The Localist Case for Federal Regimes, 21 J.L. & POL. 187, 188-91 
(2005). 
218 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of 
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
219 See supra text accompanying notes 202-206. 
220 See David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. OF PA. L. 
REV. 487, 494 (1999); Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1067-73 (1980); 
Mark C. Gordon, Differing Paradigms, Similar Flaws: Constructing a New Approach to Federalism in Congress 
and the Court, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 187, 218 (1996). 
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federal constitutional constraints when other institutions can and have provided more effective 
oversight thus encourages a dynamic, more effective type of local governance.   
 
But excessive decentralization and local governmental autonomy can prove dangerous 
not only to the autonomy and well-being of a municipality’s own citizens but also to the 
autonomy and well-being of other jurisdictions and their citizens (through, for example, 
spillover costs).  Accordingly, higher levels of authority are essential to preserve not only 
individual and regional well-being, but also local autonomy itself.221 That higher level of 
authority need not be the federal constitution—it can be state governments that exercise 
control through traditional areas of state constitutional, and statutory, and common law.  State 
laws defining and limiting property rights and municipal government offer a powerful, 
longstanding bulwark against government oppression; and at the same time, state laws and 
institutions in a federalist system offer many of the same normative and instrumental 
advantages over federal authorities as local governments offer over federal and state 
authorities.222 The overlapping layers of oversight in imposing exactions, from state statutes 
and common law through self-limiting local ordinances and the market-like activity of private 
individuals, demonstrate the advantage of a complex system of federalist governance in which 
institutions can expand or recede in importance as regulatory needs and oversight 
competencies develop.223 
Viewed this way, institutions and authorities that have classically been viewed as 
oppositional dualities—such as legislative/ judicial, constitutional/ statutory, federal/ state, 
state/ local, and public/ private—can operate in conjunction rather than in opposition.  This is 
precisely the advantage of allowing the Court’s constitutional rules over exactions to recede 
when it is unnecessary to check local discretion.  The world of land use regulation has become 
significantly more complicated and sophisticated over the past three decades, as states have 
involved themselves more in local planning, state and local governments have become more 
active in environmental protection, and all levels of government, along with private entities, 
have become more accustomed to operating together in land use regulation and 
development.224 This movement has recently led the land use scholar David Callies—who 
co-authored a 1971 book describing the “quiet revolution” in land use regulation that 
advocated stronger checks on local discretion225—to narrate a positive trajectory in which 
 
221 See David Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L. J. 377, 385-89 (2001). 
222 On the advantages of a federalist approach to the regulatory takings doctrine, see Melvyn R. Durchslag, 
Forgotten Federalism: The Takings Clause and Local Land Use Decisions, 59 MD. L. REV. 464, 490-93 (2000); 
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and Judicial 
Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 327 (1993); Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of 
Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 270-71 (2004). 
223 See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory State, 92 
IOWA L. REV.___ (forthcoming 2007) (advocating development of state common law regulation in the shadow of 
federal statutes). 
224 See ROBERT H. FREILICH, FROM SPRAWL TO SMART GROWTH: SUCCESSFUL LEGAL, PLANNING, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS 209-52 (1999) Charles M. Haar, The Twilight of Land-Use Controls: A Paradigm 
Shift?, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1011, 1030-32; John R. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: The Advent of Local 
Environmental Law, 26 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 365, 386-410 (2002) 
225 See FRED BOSSELMAN & DAVID L. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1971). 
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federal constitutional, state, and local laws and agencies combine to provide more effective 
and reasonably fair land use and environmental controls.226 Callies has suggested that the 
Supreme Court’s invigoration of the regulatory takings doctrine helped to bring this complex 
system into being.227 In the context of exactions, Nollan and Dolan may well have served a 
significant role in spurring development of more, and more sophisticated, institutional 
implementation and oversight of exactions.  But those decisions were themselves imperfect 
and have had adverse consequences.  Under the Court’s general approach to regulatory 
takings, as this approach was announced and described in Lingle, Nollan and Dolan need only 
apply in a limited fashion; an institutional web, operating in those decisions’ constitutional 
shadow, can ultimately provide better, more responsive oversight. 
 
One final note on the Court’s debatable but confident line-drawing.  The factual 
distinctions upon which Lingle relies to demarcate the limits of Nollan and Dolan’s 
applicability are neither stable nor entirely coherent.  The line between legislative and 
adjudicative regulation frequently dissolves at the local level where elected officials, who 
have less expertise than the typical federal and state administrative agency, make both 
legislative regulatory commands and administrative regulatory decisions, and where the 
legislative process is more subject to the political process failures of majoritarianism and 
factionalism.228 And the line between real and personal property similarly appears arbitrary 
and does not emanate from the bare constitutional text, as the confiscation of a thing rather 
than of land appears to its owner to be no less a “taking” of “property.”229 For better or 
worse, however, these distinctions are longstanding, and the Court appears to be so confident 
of their meaning and stability that it has to date failed to mount a serious effort to justify 
them.230 
But more important than its tendency to draw lines by ipse dixit, the Court’s limits on 
Nollan and Dolan’s applicability considers the relative probability of a taking and attempts—
just as the Court has done with its other categories of regulatory effects that receive 
 
226 See David L. Callies, The Quiet Revolution Redux: How Selected Local Governments Have Fared, 20 
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 277 (2002). 
227 Id. at 278. 
228 See sources cited supra note 86. 
229 See Eduardo Moisès Peñalver, Is Land Special? The Unjustified Preference for Landownership in 
Regulatory Takings Law, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 227 (2004); Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1151-52 
(1993); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1441 n.48 (1993). 
230 The legislative/ adjudicative distinction in administrative law dates back at least to the early twentieth 
century.  See Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (finding a tax levied on a small number of property 
owners was insufficiently legislative and the property owners were due individualized hearings to challenge the 
tax as it was levied on their property); Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Colo., 239 U.S. 
441 (1915) (finding a tax levied on all taxable property in the city of Denver to be sufficiently general to be 
considered a form of legislative rule-making).  The Supreme Court’s obsession with the special qualities of land 
ownership, which it casts in deeply historical terms, has been essential to its invigoration of the regulatory 
takings doctrine. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992) 
(proclaiming a special protection for land in “our constitutional culture”). 
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heightened scrutiny, permanent physical invasions and total diminutions of value231—to offer 
both a measure of formal protection and a hard limit on that protection’s reach.232 The 
Court’s exercises in line-drawing in its takings jurisprudence may not be persuasive as a 
matter of logic, but over time their distinctions have calcified into accepted constitutional 
common law doctrine, and lower courts are capable of making fine distinctions when factual 
circumstances blur the lines the Court has drawn.233 In order both to protect property owners 
and to restrain judicial intervention under the Takings Clause, the Court in Lingle has added 
another such distinction to its imperfect arsenal. 
 
Conclusion 
The implication of Lingle for exactions jurisprudence, then, is that Nollan and Dolan 
apply only to a narrow subset of conditions.  More broadly, Lingle authoritatively declares the 
narrow, if still occasionally powerful reach of the regulatory takings doctrine.  And lower 
courts seem untroubled by the task of applying the decisions, albeit in a limited manner, as the 
few reported appellate decisions on exactions since Lingle demonstrate a small but discernible 
trend towards adopting the Court’s dicta as suggestive, if not binding. The Washington 
Supreme Court, in evaluating whether the state’s impact fee statute incorporates the Nollan 
and Dolan test, concluded that Nollan and Dolan do not apply either to impact fees or to 
legislatively imposed exactions.234 The Federal Circuit has held that for Nollan and Dolan to 
apply to a development condition requiring the property owners to commit identified acres of 
their property to wetlands in order to mitigate the destruction of other wetlands, the 
 
231 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.. 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (permanent physical 
invasion of property effects a taking); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (a 
regulation that denies an owner “all economically beneficial uses” of her land is likely to effect a taking).  In his 
dissent in Lucas, Justice Stevens criticized the majority’s line between total takings, which receive a form of 
strict scrutiny, and takings that merely diminish the property by 95%. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1064 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia’s response is not particularly impressive:  “Takings law is 
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criticism. See Joseph William Singer & Jack M. Beermann, The Social Origins of Property, 6 CAN. J.L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 217, 224-28 (1993). 
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discretion to the county to determine the extent of the exaction, to which Nollan and Dolan apply, from a 
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234 City of Olympia v. Drebick, 126 P.3d 802, 808 (Wash. 2006) (interpreting R.C.W. 82.02.050-.090). 
Accordingly, municipalities in Washington need only require that the impact fees they impose are “reasonably 
related and beneficial to the particular development seeking approval,” and may include fees that would fund 
area-wide infrastructure.  Id. at 811. 
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government must take the owners’ right to exclude.235 Consistent with this limited reading of 
the exactions decisions’ reach, a Wisconsin intermediate appellate court has held that Dolan’s 
requirement of an “individualized determination” precludes a facial challenge to a 
legislatively-imposed exaction program, because no property owner would as yet have been 
denied such a determination.236 
Although neither entirely coherent nor pleasing to advocates on either side of the 
regulatory divide, Lingle recognizes the limited nature of the Takings Clause and the finite 
ability of courts applying the regulatory takings doctrine to complex, localized land use 
disputes.  Nollan and Dolan have had an uneven and uncertain effect on land use regulation.  
Lingle attempted to clarify why and how those decisions fit within the regulatory takings 
doctrine.  It will limit their direct effects and thus should help other institutions to more 
effectively perform their roles in helping to direct and improve the necessary exercise of local 
discretion.   
 
235 Norman v. United States, 429 F.3d 1081, 1089-90 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
236 See Wisconsin Builders Ass’n v. Wisconsin Dept of Transportation, 702 N.W.2d 433, 448 (Ct.App. 
Wisc. 2005).  In Wisconsin Builders, the challenged administrative scheme allowed a property owner to receive a 
“special exception” if the condition on development, which prohibited structures and improvements within a 
setback area adjacent to an existing road, would result in “practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship . . . and 
[is] not contrary to the public interest,” and which protected the DOT from providing compensation if any 
improvements in that area are later damaged if the land were taken for road widening.  Id. at 436 (quoting the 
relevant provisions from Wisconsin Administrative Codes). 
